Parker v. Credit Agricole Securities Inc.

Background

Parker Shannon brought discrimination and retaliation claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) against Credit Agricole Securities (USA), Inc. The opinion states that Parker was diagnosed with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma in 2008 and later received treatment and disability benefits. The parties disputed which company hired him and disputed how much his supervisors knew about his cancer and when they knew it.

Parker alleged that he was terminated because of his cancer diagnosis. The defendant maintained that his position was eliminated as part of restructuring and job cuts. Parker also alleged that he was retaliated against after complaining about discrimination. His November 20, 2012 complaint did not mention his disability, according to his sworn testimony. He later sent a written complaint through his lawyer; the opinion refers to that correspondence as occurring on January 2, 2013 in the background section, but as occurring on January 2, 2012 in the retaliation discussion.

Motion to Strike

Parker moved to strike portions of the defendant’s statement of facts under Local Civil Rule 56.1. The court denied that motion. It explained that Parker’s objections often consisted only of citations to evidence or procedural rules without an explanation, and that some record citations did not give the court a reasonable way to locate the cited material. The court considered properly developed admissibility arguments when deciding whether facts were disputed.

ADA Discrimination Claim

The court granted summary judgment on Parker’s discrimination claim. Summary judgment is a decision without a trial when the record shows no genuine dispute over a fact important to the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

For an ADA discriminatory-discharge claim, Parker had to show, among other things, that he was qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, with or without a reasonable accommodation, and that he suffered an adverse employment action because of his disability. The defendant did not contest the first two elements for purposes of the motion, but the court found that Parker had not established the remaining elements.

The court relied on Parker’s sworn statements to the Social Security Administration, Prudential, and Mass Mutual that chemotherapy had severely impaired his cognitive functioning and left him unable to perform his occupation or any occupation. The court stated that such statements do not automatically bar an ADA claim, but that Parker needed to explain how he could perform the essential functions of his job despite those earlier statements. The court found that he had not provided that explanation and had not shown that his condition deteriorated between the November 2012 termination and the January 2013 start of his disability leave.

The court also rejected Parker’s proposed accommodation of having someone else perform certain Korea and Taiwan specialist functions while Parker performed only the key relationship-manager role. It held that removing an essential job function is not a reasonable accommodation, and that the ADA does not require an employer to create a new position. The court further found that Parker had not explained why his cognitive limitations prevented him from performing the specialist functions but not the key-manager functions.

The court separately concluded that Parker had not shown that the defendant acted because of his disability. The defendant offered restructuring and elimination of Parker’s position as a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason. The court found no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that reason was a pretext, noting that the defendant did not hire someone else to fill Parker’s position, Parker’s supervisor later was also terminated, supervisors tried to find Parker another position, and the defendant allowed him to take disability leave.

ADA Retaliation Claim

The court also granted summary judgment on Parker’s ADA retaliation claim. To establish retaliation, Parker had to show that he engaged in activity protected by the ADA, that the employer knew about it, that an adverse employment action occurred, and that the protected activity caused that action.

The court found that Parker’s November 20, 2012 complaint was not protected activity because Parker admitted that he did not mention his disability in it. The court also held that, even if the complaint had qualified as protected activity, Parker had not shown that the defendant’s stated reason for ending his employment was a pretext for retaliation.

As to the later attorney letter, the court held that the defendant’s January 4, 2013 response was not an adverse employment action. Parker had already been terminated from his preferred position, and the defendant’s letter offered to keep him employed through February 2013. The court concluded that this temporary opportunity did not materially worsen the terms or conditions of his employment.

Disposition

The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, denied Parker’s motion to strike, directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment and close the case, and did not consider the defendant’s alternative argument that Parker’s claims were time-barred.