Doe v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Background

John Doe and the organizational plaintiffs The Door, Make the Road New York, New York Immigration Coalition, Sanctuary for Families, and the Urban Justice Center sued U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and federal officials acting in their official capacities. They challenged ICE’s policy of making civil immigration arrests of noncitizens in and around New York state courthouses without judicial warrants.

The plaintiffs alleged that ICE’s January 10, 2018 directive expanded courthouse enforcement beyond an earlier policy that focused on specifically targeted people. The directive identified several categories of people who could be targeted and also allowed enforcement against people encountered during an enforcement action under “special circumstances,” decided case by case. The complaint alleged that courthouse enforcement in and around New York courts increased substantially and created fear that discouraged noncitizens from pursuing or defending legal claims. The organizational plaintiffs alleged that the policy interfered with their legal services and required them to divert resources to address its effects.

The plaintiffs sought a declaration that the policy was illegal and unconstitutional and a permanent injunction barring civil immigration arrests without judicial warrants of people coming to, attending, or returning from court.

Jurisdiction and standing

The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), which challenges the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. They argued that John Doe and the organizations lacked constitutional standing. They also argued that the organizations’ Administrative Procedure Act claim failed because their interests were outside the relevant statute’s protected zone of interests, ICE’s enforcement-location decisions were committed to agency discretion, and the directive was not final agency action.

The court rejected those arguments. It held that Doe adequately alleged an actual and imminent injury because he intended to seek an order of protection in family court but refrained because he feared arrest by ICE. The court also held that the organizational plaintiffs adequately alleged injury because they had diverted resources and were impeded in providing legal services.

The court further held that the organizational plaintiffs fell within the Administrative Procedure Act’s “zone of interests”—the group of interests the relevant law arguably protects or regulates—because they served immigrants affected by the challenged enforcement policy. The court also ruled that the policy was reviewable. It concluded that the complaint adequately alleged both that the directive had a substantial practical impact and that it was final agency action, meaning an agency decision with legal consequences that completed the agency’s decision-making process.

Common-law and Administrative Procedure Act claims

The defendants separately moved under Rule 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. They argued that no common-law privilege against civil courthouse arrests existed and that, even if one existed, the Immigration and Nationality Act displaced it.

The court rejected both arguments. It held that New York common law recognizes a privilege protecting people from civil arrest while attending court and while necessarily coming to or returning from court. The court relied on the privilege’s historical development and its purposes, including encouraging parties and witnesses to attend court and protecting the orderly administration of justice.

The court then held that the Immigration and Nationality Act did not preempt or displace that privilege. The statutory provisions authorizing civil immigration arrests did not specifically address arrests in and around courthouses, and the court found no clear and manifest congressional purpose to eliminate the common-law protection. The court also concluded that a statutory provision addressing protections for certain noncitizens arrested at courthouses did not clearly authorize courthouse arrests; instead, it was intended to provide protections to people subject to such enforcement.

Because the privilege remained in force and was not displaced by federal law, the court denied the motion to dismiss the common-law and Administrative Procedure Act claims.

Constitutional claims

The plaintiffs alleged that the courthouse-arrest policy violated their rights of access to the courts under the First and Fifth Amendments. The court held that the complaint adequately alleged actual injury because arrests and the resulting atmosphere of fear allegedly deterred the plaintiffs and their clients from bringing meritorious claims. The court concluded that these allegations could amount to the functional equivalent of denying access to the courts. It rejected the defendants’ argument that noncitizens unlawfully present in the United States could not assert the relevant First Amendment rights, and it noted that the Fifth Amendment’s due-process protection applies to noncitizens within the United States.

The court reached a different conclusion regarding the Sixth Amendment claim. It held that the right of access to the courts is not grounded in the Sixth Amendment. It also found that the complaint did not allege that the policy interfered with the plaintiffs’ own right to confront witnesses and that the allegations concerning access to counsel were too conclusory. The court therefore dismissed the Sixth Amendment claim for failure to state a claim.

Disposition

The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss as to all claims except the Sixth Amendment claim and granted the motion as to the Sixth Amendment claim. The court directed the parties to meet and confer within seven days and submit a joint letter updating the court on the case and proposing next steps.