Palin v. The New York Times Company

Background

Sarah Palin brought one defamation claim against The New York Times Company based on the newspaper’s June 14, 2017 editorial titled “America’s Lethal Politics,” which concerned gun control. The later operative complaint also named James Bennet, who wrote the relevant portions of the editorial. The opinion states that Palin did not dispute that she was a public figure.

In an earlier opinion, the court held that the federal Constitution required Palin to prove “actual malice”—that the defendants knew the statements were false or acted with reckless disregard for whether they were false—and to prove it by clear and convincing evidence. The court had not decided whether New York law independently imposed the same requirement. The case was set for trial.

Motion under Rule 54(b)

The defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) to modify the earlier interlocutory ruling. Rule 54(b) allows a court to revise an order before final judgment, although prior decisions generally should not be revisited without a good reason. The court held that an intervening change in controlling law supplied that reason.

New York amended its anti-strategic-lawsuit-against-public-participation law, commonly called the anti-SLAPP law, on November 10, 2020. Before the amendment, the law’s actual-malice requirement generally applied to claims involving public applications or permits. The amendment broadened the law to cover claims based on communications in public places or forums concerning issues of public interest, as well as other lawful speech or petitioning conduct concerning such issues. The amended law defines “public interest” broadly to exclude only purely private matters.

The defendants argued that the amended law applied retroactively to Palin’s case and independently required her to prove actual malice by clear and convincing evidence under New York law. They said deciding the issue before trial would simplify future proceedings, including any appeal, and assist with jury instructions. Palin argued that the defendants had not shown extraordinary circumstances for reconsideration, that the federal requirement already controlled the trial, and that deciding the state-law issue would be an advisory opinion.

Court’s analysis

The court determined that New York Civil Rights Law § 76-a is substantive rather than procedural, so a federal court hearing the case must apply it. The central question was whether the amended provision should apply retroactively even though Palin filed the case before the amendment took effect and the case had not yet gone to trial.

Under New York law, statutory amendments are generally presumed to apply prospectively unless the Legislature clearly indicates retroactive application. Remedial legislation—legislation intended to correct defects in prior law and provide relief to an aggrieved party—is an exception that should be applied retroactively to advance its purpose. The court found that § 76-a was remedial. It relied on the Legislature’s direction that the amendment take effect immediately and on legislative history stating that the amendment was intended to correct the narrow scope of the prior anti-SLAPP law and provide stronger protection for speech, petitioning, and association rights concerning public issues.

The court rejected Palin’s arguments against retroactivity. It found that the absence of an express reference to pending actions did not defeat retroactive application. It also rejected the argument that a New York Court of Appeals decision created a special presumption against retroactivity whenever substantive rights were affected. Finally, the court found no due-process problem because Palin had no reasonable reliance interest in avoiding the actual-malice requirement: federal constitutional law already required her, as a public figure, to prove actual malice to recover damages for defamation.

The court expressly stated that it was not deciding whether § 76-a reaches a broader group of plaintiffs than the federal Constitution does. It also did not decide whether another amended provision, § 70-a, applied to this action.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ motion. It held that the amended version of New York Civil Rights Law § 76-a applies to this action and requires Palin, under state law, to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the allegedly defamatory statements were made with actual malice. The opinion did not decide the ultimate merits of Palin’s defamation claim or the outcome of the planned trial. The Clerk was directed to close the docket entry for the motion.