Valverde v. Folks

Background

Angel Valverde brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against correctional officers and supervisory officials connected with Sing Sing Correctional Facility and Downstate Correctional Facility. He alleged that correctional officers used excessive force against him, that he was injured, and that he later received a disciplinary sentence of 180 days in solitary confinement. The motion addressed only claims against Michael Capra, the superintendent of Sing Sing Correctional Facility, and Robert Morton, the superintendent of Downstate Correctional Facility.

Valverde asserted that Capra was deliberately indifferent to his safety through inadequate staffing, training, supervision, and procedures, and that Capra failed to intervene in or conceal the alleged assault. He asserted that Morton violated procedural due process by affirming the disciplinary hearing and denying his grievance about the assault, threats, and harassment. The court also treated the grievance allegations as asserting a deliberate-indifference claim against Morton.

Court’s Analysis

A complaint must contain enough factual matter to make a claim plausible. A supervisor generally cannot be held liable under § 1983 merely because of the supervisor’s position; the plaintiff must allege the supervisor’s personal involvement in the constitutional violation.

As to Capra, the court held that Valverde did not allege facts showing that Capra knew or had reason to know of a substantial risk that correctional officers would engage in misconduct and deliberately disregarded that risk. Valverde alleged that he had sent a letter about prior incidents to the governor, state investigative offices, and a Sing Sing captain, but did not allege that Capra received the letter or otherwise knew about those incidents. The court also held that Valverde did not allege that Capra knew about the assault or had a realistic opportunity to intervene. The allegations that Capra was involved in Valverde’s transfer under New York Correction Law § 23 were conclusory and could not establish personal involvement based only on Capra’s position.

As to Morton, the court did not decide whether affirming the disciplinary hearing was enough by itself to establish personal involvement because Morton was entitled to qualified immunity. Qualified immunity protects a government official from liability when the official’s conduct did not violate a clearly established legal right. The court found that courts were divided over whether affirming a prison disciplinary decision establishes supervisory liability, so the law was not clearly established.

The court likewise held that Valverde had not shown personal involvement by Morton based on the denial of his grievance. The grievance concerned an assault that had already occurred and did not allege an ongoing violation that Morton could remedy. The court separately concluded that Morton was entitled to qualified immunity because the law was unsettled about whether denying a grievance establishes personal involvement in the underlying violation.

Disposition

The court granted in its entirety Capra and Morton’s motion to dismiss the case as against them. The court dismissed the claims against Capra for failure to allege personal involvement and dismissed the claims against Morton because he was entitled to qualified immunity. The court denied Valverde’s request to file a fourth amended complaint, finding that the pleading deficiencies could not be cured and that Valverde had already amended his complaint three times. The clerk was directed to terminate the case as to Capra and Morton and close the motion docket entry.