Stewart v. Fashion Institute of Technology

Background

Lynda T. Stewart sued the Fashion Institute of Technology under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. She alleged that FIT discriminated against her because she is African-American and retaliated against her after she complained about racial discrimination when FIT did not reappoint her as a part-time adjunct professor. Stewart’s Rehabilitation Act claims were withdrawn. FIT moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence requires a trial or instead entitles one side to judgment as a matter of law.

Stewart was subject to a semester-by-semester reappointment process governed in part by a collective bargaining agreement. The process included classroom observations, student evaluations, a faculty discussion, and a vote by eligible permanent faculty members. Stewart was not reappointed after votes in March 2017, October 2017, and March 2018. The March 2018 vote was followed by FIT’s decision not to appoint her for the fall 2018 semester.

The record included criticism of Stewart’s teaching, organization, preparation, technology use, and response to feedback. The court also noted that white adjunct professors were not reappointed during some of the same periods. Stewart believed that the criticism and decisions were racially motivated. She complained internally about racial bias in October 2017 and made similar allegations in a rebuttal to a spring 2018 classroom observation.

Race-discrimination claim

The court applied the burden-shifting framework used for employment-discrimination claims. Stewart had to present evidence that her non-reappointment occurred under circumstances suggesting racial discrimination. The court held that she did not meet that requirement.

The court found no evidence that the faculty members who observed or voted on Stewart’s reappointment made racially degrading comments or treated people of another race more favorably than Stewart. It held that Stewart’s beliefs that the criticism was harsh, condescending, unfair, or racially motivated were not enough without specific supporting facts. Her testimony about other African-American professors who allegedly were not promoted also lacked evidence about the decision-makers’ actions, the candidates’ qualifications, or the relevant evaluations.

The court rejected Stewart’s argument that the destruction of notes from reappointment meetings supported an inference of discrimination. It found that the evidence showed, at most, a general practice of discarding notes and did not establish that notes from Stewart’s meetings were destroyed after FIT had notice of possible litigation or that the practice departed from normal procedure.

The court also identified evidence weighing against an inference of discrimination. Sackin, whom Stewart identified as influential in the decision, had rehired her in 2013. Sackin voted for approval with reservations in one of the reappointment votes. White adjunct professors were also not reappointed, and the final decision was made by a faculty vote rather than by Sackin or any single observer. The court therefore held that Stewart failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.

FIT’s stated reasons

The court alternatively held that, even if Stewart had established an initial case of discrimination, FIT had identified legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the non-reappointment decisions. Those reasons included repeated concerns in student evaluations and faculty observations about teaching clarity, organization, preparation, technology, and Stewart’s response to constructive feedback.

The court held that Stewart’s disagreement with the evaluations and her belief that the criticism was wrong did not establish that FIT’s reasons were false or that racial discrimination was the real reason. It concluded that the record contained no evidence of pretext, meaning a false explanation masking unlawful discrimination.

Retaliation claim

The court did not treat Stewart’s retaliation claim as abandoned, even though FIT argued that she had not adequately addressed it in her opposition. The court found that Stewart’s internal complaint and her later statements alleging racial bias qualified as protected activity—conduct opposing discrimination under Title VII. It also found that the timing of her complaint and the later non-reappointment was enough to establish an initial inference of a causal connection.

But the court held that temporal proximity alone was not enough at the later stage of the analysis. Stewart’s spring 2018 rebuttal followed the negative evaluation and was required to be read under FIT’s policy and the collective bargaining agreement. The court found no evidence that her complaints caused any faculty member to vote against reappointment. It also emphasized that the faculty had twice voted not to reappoint Stewart before she complained about discrimination. The court therefore held that retaliation was not the but-for cause of her non-reappointment and that no genuine issue of material fact required a trial.

Disposition

Judge Lewis J. Liman granted FIT’s motion for summary judgment on all counts, dismissed the Complaint, directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment for FIT, and directed the Clerk to close the case.