Melton v. Malcolm Shabazz, L.P.

Background

Myung-Ja Melton sued Malcolm Shabazz, L.P., which owned her apartment building, and Covington Realty Services, Inc., which managed it. She alleged that the defendants violated the Fair Housing Act by delaying repairs and treating her unfairly because of her race and/or national origin. Melton proceeded without a lawyer in the case, although she had limited-scope pro bono counsel for depositions.

Melton reported plumbing problems beginning in 2015, including a malfunctioning kitchen faucet, water damage, sewage and suds backing up into her kitchen sink, and damage to her cabinets and floor. The defendants eventually repaired the floor, cabinets, and faucet. The parties disputed, among other things, whether delays were partly caused by Melton limiting access to her apartment.

Claims and legal standards

The court treated Melton’s allegations as claims under Section 3604(b) of the Fair Housing Act. That provision prohibits discrimination in the terms, conditions, or privileges of renting a home, and in related services or facilities, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin. The court explained that this can include delaying maintenance or repairs for a discriminatory reason.

The defendants moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court had to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Melton, but unsupported assertions were not enough to defeat the motion.

The defendants also argued that the claims were untimely under the Fair Housing Act’s two-year limitations period. The court declined to dismiss the claims on that ground because, viewing the facts favorably to Melton, the alleged discriminatory conduct included delayed repairs, including cabinet repairs completed on December 29, 2018. The court therefore addressed the claims on their merits.

Court’s analysis

For the delayed-repair claim, the court found that Melton had not presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could find discriminatory motivation. Melton generally asserted that other tenants received cabinet repairs sooner, but she did not identify a tenant who received repairs more quickly or provide evidence showing when those tenants requested repairs. Photographs of cabinets outside the building did not establish who placed them there or why.

The court also considered Melton’s allegations that the defendants blamed her for water damage while protecting African American and/or Muslim tenants whom she believed had unauthorized washing machines. The court found these assertions speculative and unsupported by evidence that the defendants acted because of Melton’s race or national origin. The court similarly found no evidence that the alleged harassment, intimidation, or blaming by the superintendent and others was motivated by discrimination.

Rule 56(d) request

Melton sought additional discovery concerning cabinet replacements in other apartments and the cause of the water damage. Rule 56(d) may allow more time for discovery when a party identifies specific facts needed to oppose summary judgment and explains why those facts cannot yet be presented.

The court denied Melton’s Rule 56(d) application. It found that she relied on speculation, that the defendants had represented they produced responsive records, that Melton had had opportunities to question relevant witnesses, and that she had not shown how the requested discovery would create a genuine dispute about discriminatory intent.

Disposition

Judge Stewart D. Aaron granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court denied Melton’s Rule 56(d) application and directed the Clerk of Court to mail the opinion to her and close the case.