Wiggins v. Griffin

Background

Robert Wiggins, proceeding without a lawyer and without paying the filing fee, sued Thomas Griffin, M. Kopp, D. Howard, and Dr. G. Jebamani under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He alleged that, while incarcerated at Green Haven Correctional Facility, the defendants violated his First Amendment right to practice his religion and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection.

After Wiggins was transferred from one housing block to another on April 3, 2017, his name was not placed on the Protestant religious-services call-out list. He was not called for services on April 8, 2017. Wiggins asked that his name be restored and sent letters to Jebamani and Griffin. Jebamani requested updates to the list on June 5 and July 25, 2017. After Griffin received Wiggins’s September 18, 2017 letter, Griffin referred it to Howard, who updated the list. Wiggins was able to attend Protestant services beginning September 23, 2017, until his transfer from Green Haven in August 2018.

Wiggins filed a grievance on September 18, 2017. The grievance committee denied it as moot because he had been placed on the call-out list and stated that compensation was outside its authority. The superintendent and the Central Office Review Committee upheld that decision. Although Wiggins also appeared to seek injunctive and declaratory relief, the court treated the case as seeking money damages because he could attend services again and no longer remained at Green Haven.

Summary-judgment standard

The defendants moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court stated that it had to view reasonable inferences in Wiggins’s favor, but that speculation could not create a trial-worthy factual dispute.

First Amendment claim

The court held that the evidence did not establish that Wiggins’s inability to attend Protestant services substantially burdened a sincerely held religious belief. Wiggins testified that he had sometimes missed services for other reasons, waited more than five months to file a formal grievance, and did not testify that the missed services forced him to change his behavior or violate his beliefs. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find a substantial burden.

The court also held that Green Haven’s requirement that prisoners appear on a call-out list before attending services was reasonably related to legitimate prison interests, including tracking prisoners’ religious preferences and locations and maintaining security and safety. In addition, the court found that the defendants did not have reason to know that their conduct was unlawfully burdening Wiggins’s religious practice. The record instead showed that, after receiving information about the problem, the defendants worked to restore his access to services.

The court therefore granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the First Amendment free-exercise claim. It separately granted summary judgment based on qualified immunity, which generally protects officials from damages when their conduct did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. The court framed the relevant question as whether Wiggins had a clearly established right to attend religious services when his name was not on the call-out list. It found that Wiggins identified no case establishing such a right and that the defendants’ conduct was not plainly incompetent or knowingly unlawful.

The court also noted that Wiggins made no allegations against Kopp and testified that he had not interacted with Kopp about the events. It stated that the claims against Kopp would alternatively fail for lack of personal involvement.

Fourteenth Amendment claim

The court interpreted Wiggins’s equal-protection allegation as a selective-enforcement claim. Such a claim requires proof that the plaintiff was treated differently from similarly situated people and that the different treatment was based on an improper consideration, such as religion or an intent to punish constitutional activity.

The court agreed with defendants that Wiggins had not alleged or supported with evidence that he was treated differently from other members of a protected class. The Fourteenth Amendment claim therefore failed as a matter of law. The court also stated that, to the extent Wiggins intended to assert a claim based on an agency policy or custom, that claim failed because he did not name a municipality as a defendant and had not established a policy or custom causing a constitutional violation.

Disposition

The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. It directed the clerk to terminate the pending motion and terminate the action. Judge Philip M. Halpern also directed the clerk to mail Wiggins a copy of the opinion and order.