Lue v. JPMorgan Chase & Co.

Background

Candice Lue, proceeding without a lawyer, sued JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Chase employees Alex Khavin, Fidelia Shillingford, Kimberly Dauber, Baruch Horowitz, Chris Liasis, and Michelle Sullivan. She asserted seven causes of action: defamation, common-law conspiracy, false and fraudulent acts and conduct, actual malice, libel, defamation per se, and defamation by implication.

The claims arose from statements that defendants made in written submissions and testimony during an earlier related lawsuit involving Lue’s employment at Chase. Lue alleged that defendants’ statements about her work performance, job duties, coworkers, supervisors, hiring and termination decisions, and work-from-home practices were false and harmed her reputation. The court treated her claim for false and fraudulent acts and conduct as another defamation claim. It also explained that actual malice is not an independent claim, but an element that may matter in a defamation action.

Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

Defendants moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which permits dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim. The court accepted well-pleaded factual allegations as true, drew reasonable inferences in Lue’s favor, and construed her filings liberally because she was representing herself. The court also took judicial notice of filings from the earlier related litigation.

Judicial-Proceedings Privilege

The court held that New York’s absolute judicial-proceedings privilege barred Lue’s claims. That privilege protects oral and written communications made during judicial proceedings, including statements by parties, attorneys, witnesses, and judges. It applies when a statement is pertinent to the litigation, under a broad standard, and is not lost merely because the statement was allegedly made with actual malice.

The court found that each challenged statement appeared in defendants’ filings or testimony before the Second Circuit during the earlier related litigation. The statements were material and pertinent to that proceeding, and the court described them as central to defendants’ defense. Therefore, the statements could not serve as the basis for a defamation claim. The court rejected Lue’s argument that the privilege should not apply because the alleged defamation was indirect rather than explicit.

Failure to State a Defamation Claim

The court separately held that Lue failed to state a plausible defamation claim even if the privilege did not apply. Under New York law, a defamation claim generally requires a false and defamatory statement of fact, publication to a third party, reference to the plaintiff, the required level of fault, special damages or a qualifying form of defamation per se, and the absence of privilege.

The court ruled that negative comments in Lue’s performance reviews were opinions about her job performance rather than objectively verifiable statements of fact. It also found no indication that defendants were negligent in making or distributing the challenged statements, noting the investigations and efforts to check the allegations described in the earlier litigation.

Lue did not specifically identify special damages, such as actual lost income or specific lost employment opportunities. Although she alleged that her career prospects had been reduced, the court found that allegation insufficiently specific and noted that she acknowledged obtaining employment after the statements were made.

The court also rejected defamation per se. It found that the comments about Lue’s performance and workplace relationships did not accuse her of conduct incompatible with her profession, and that disagreements about facts previously argued in the earlier litigation did not, on their face, defame her in her business or profession. The court further ruled that Lue had not adequately alleged defamation by implication because she did not plausibly show that defendants intended or endorsed a false defamatory inference.

Because Lue failed to state a defamation claim, the court also dismissed her conspiracy claim. Under New York law, civil conspiracy requires an underlying actionable tort, and the court found that Lue had not stated such a tort.

Disposition

The court held that amendment would be futile because the claims were barred by New York’s absolute privilege. It denied leave to amend and dismissed the Amended Complaint with prejudice. The court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss with prejudice, directed the Clerk to terminate all pending motions and adjourned dates, and closed the case.