Rodriguez v. Village of Port Chester & Police Officer Ken Manning
- Judith McCarthy
- 7:19-cv-04728
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 31
In Rodriguez v. Village of Port Chester, Judge McCarthy granted in part and denied in part pretrial evidence motions before trial.
Derek Rodriguez and the defendants, Village of Port Chester and Police Officer Ken Manning, because the order determines what evidence and damages arguments may be presented at trial.
What happened
Rodriguez v. Village of Port Chester & Police Officer Ken Manning concerned several requests to limit evidence before Derek Rodriguez’s scheduled trial. The defendants challenged proposed expert testimony, a medical illustration, and damages evidence; Rodriguez challenged evidence about his past interactions with Port Chester police, arrests, and convictions.
The court limited Dr. Richard Weinstein’s testimony but allowed him to testify as a treating physician about Rodriguez’s treatment, condition, diagnosis, causation, and prognosis, including why being stepped on caused the injuries rather than jumping from a porch. The court allowed Rodriguez to use the medical illustration as demonstrative evidence, subject to authentication and a later ruling at trial, and allowed certain ankle-related pain-and-suffering damages while excluding medical expenses, lost wages, insurance co-pays, and police-related emotional-distress damages. The court also barred the defendants from using Rodriguez’s prior police interactions and misstatements about his address for the stated purposes, while finding the arrest-and-conviction issue moot.
Judge McCarthy concluded that the defendants’ three motions in limine were granted in part and denied in part, Rodriguez’s first motion was granted, and his second motion was denied as moot.
The detailed version
- Rodriguez v. Village of Port Chester & Police Officer Ken Manning · No. 7:19-cv-04728
- Judith McCarthy
- Apr. 26, 2021
Background
The opinion addresses motions in limine, which are requests for advance rulings about evidence expected at trial. Trial was scheduled to begin on May 19, 2021. The defendants sought to exclude or limit Dr. Richard Weinstein’s expert testimony about the cause of Rodriguez’s ankle injuries, a medical illustration, and evidence of compensatory damages. Rodriguez sought to exclude evidence of his earlier interactions with Port Chester police and evidence of his arrests or convictions.
Expert testimony
The court held that Dr. Weinstein’s original report did not satisfy the detailed expert-report requirements for a specially retained expert under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2)(B). The report stated that Rodriguez’s injury resulted from being stepped on but did not adequately explain the facts, reasoning, or data supporting that conclusion. The court also held that a later addendum could not repair the original report’s deficiencies or serve as a timely rebuttal report.
The court nevertheless held that Dr. Weinstein could testify in a more limited capacity as Rodriguez’s treating physician under Rule 26(a)(2)(C). The original disclosure and report adequately notified the defendants that Dr. Weinstein would address whether Rodriguez’s injuries resulted from being stepped on rather than from jumping from a porch. He could testify about matters within the scope of Rodriguez’s treatment, including treatment, condition, diagnosis, causation, and prognosis, and about his reasoning on the stepped-on-versus-jump issue.
The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion concerning causation testimony. Dr. Weinstein could not use the addendum, expressly explain why the defendants’ expert, Dr. Chaiyaporn Kulsakdinun, was wrong, discuss other physicians’ opinions beyond the disclosed topics, or offer the legal conclusion that Officer Ken Manning’s interaction with Rodriguez was an “assault.” His trial testimony had to remain within the subjects identified in the original report and disclosure.
Medical illustration
The court declined to preclude Rodriguez from using a medical illustration of his ankle as demonstrative evidence. It rejected the defendants’ arguments that the illustration was untimely or subject to the cited discovery-production requirements, noting that it had been available to them for more than five months and had been disclosed under the trial order. The illustration could be used to help explain medical testimony, but it would need to be authenticated by a witness and accurately reflect that witness’s testimony and opinions. The court reserved a final admissibility ruling until trial.
The court did not rule on the admissibility of an illustrator’s letter because Rodriguez had not indicated that he would offer the letter into evidence.
Compensatory damages
The defendants argued that Rodriguez should be barred from presenting compensatory-damages evidence because he had not provided a damages computation under Rule 26(a)(1)(A)(iii). The court did not need to decide the issue of medical expenses, lost wages, or insurance co-pays because Rodriguez had stated that he would not seek those damages at trial.
The court held that Rodriguez could present evidence of past and future pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life specifically related to his ankle injury, despite the absence of a precise computation. The court found that Rodriguez’s discovery response disclaiming emotional injury or mental suffering did not clearly and unequivocally waive ankle-related pain-and-suffering damages. Rodriguez could also seek punitive damages and nominal damages. He could not seek emotional-distress damages related to his interactions with police on the incident date, or compensatory damages for medical expenses, lost wages, or co-pays.
Prior police interactions, arrests, and convictions
The court granted Rodriguez’s first motion concerning his prior interactions with Port Chester police. The defendants could not use those interactions to argue that Rodriguez acted consistently with a particular character trait on the date at issue. The defendants’ proposed use of the evidence to rebut police-related emotional-distress damages was moot because Rodriguez said he would not present such damages. The court noted that the issue could be revisited if Rodriguez opened the door during direct examination.
The court also barred the defendants from using Rodriguez’s alleged prior misstatements to police officers about his home address to impeach his truthfulness. It found that the statements were not made under oath, that their probative value was minimal, and that their prejudicial effect outweighed that value. The defendants could not introduce Rodriguez’s history of arrests and police interactions for the prohibited character purpose.
Rodriguez’s second motion, seeking exclusion of evidence of convictions and arrests, was denied as moot. The defendants had not indicated that they intended to offer prior convictions under the rule governing impeachment by conviction, and they stated that they did not intend to use the arrests and detentions in their main presentation. The court had already addressed the defendants’ stated impeachment purpose.
Disposition
The court stated that the defendants’ three motions in limine were granted in part and denied in part. Rodriguez’s first motion was granted, and his second motion was denied as moot. The clerk was directed to close the pending motions. This order addressed trial evidence and did not decide the underlying claims on their merits.
Read the full 31-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.