Lyons v. State of New York, Division of Police

Background

Seamus Lyons and Noel Nelson sued the State of New York, Division of Police, and Joseph D’Amico in his individual capacity. Nelson asserted race-discrimination and retaliation claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, along with a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Both Plaintiffs asserted retaliation claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.

The dispute arose from investigations into missing drug evidence and later disciplinary proceedings. Nelson alleged that the Division of Police reduced his duties because of his race and retaliated after he complained internally and filed a discrimination charge with the New York State Division of Human Rights. Lyons alleged that Defendants retaliated against him because he raised concerns on Nelson’s behalf.

In June 2020, the Court granted Defendants’ summary-judgment motion in part, dismissed Nelson’s Title VII claims with prejudice, and denied the motion as to the Section 1981 and First Amendment retaliation claims.

Motions for Reconsideration

Nelson moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(1) for reconsideration of the dismissal of his Title VII retaliation claim. He argued that his claim included retaliatory acts occurring after his protected activity, including D’Amico’s direction of a second investigation and the filing of disciplinary charges, and that the New York State Division of Police could be liable for those acts by its agent.

Defendants moved under Rules 60(b)(1) and 60(b)(2) for reconsideration of the denial of summary judgment on the Section 1983 retaliation claim. They argued that Nelson had not made the required initial showing of constructive discharge and that newly discovered evidence showed D’Amico decided to begin the second investigation before Nelson filed his state discrimination charge.

Court’s Analysis

The Court explained that reconsideration is an exceptional remedy generally available only when the court overlooked controlling law or important evidence. It also explained that summary judgment is proper only when no genuine dispute of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

As to constructive discharge, the Court clarified that its earlier opinion had focused on the filing of disciplinary charges as the alleged retaliatory act, rather than requiring Plaintiffs to prove constructive discharge. The Court therefore did not need to decide whether Plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of constructive discharge.

The Court denied Defendants’ Rule 60(b)(2) request. It concluded that the proposed new evidence was not material because it could at most show that D’Amico decided to begin the second investigation before Nelson’s later state discrimination charge. It did not resolve when D’Amico learned of Nelson’s earlier internal complaint, nor did it resolve the other factual dispute that had prevented summary judgment.

The Court also rejected Defendants’ argument that Nelson’s Title VII retaliation claim could not rely on D’Amico’s conduct. The Court explained that Title VII permits an employer to be held responsible for retaliation by its agents, although individuals cannot be held personally liable under Title VII. Because D’Amico was a superintendent senior to Nelson, the Court held that the Division of Police could be liable for retaliatory acts properly attributable to D’Amico.

Disposition

The Court denied Defendants’ motion under Rule 60(b)(2), granted both motions under Rule 60(b)(1), and, upon reconsideration, reinstated Nelson’s Title VII retaliation claim against the New York State Division of Police. The order directed the parties to attend a telephonic pretrial conference and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the two motions.