DeLaney v. Perez

Background

Clarence DeLaney, Jr. alleged that he was sentenced to two to four years of parole supervision and was supposed to be transferred to the Willard Drug Program for a 90-day program. The sentencing paperwork was inconsistent: the remarks section referred to parole supervision, but the form did not check the box for executing the sentence that way. DeLaney alleged that his release date was therefore set incorrectly and that he was held at Downstate Correctional Facility before being transferred to other facilities and eventually to Willard.

DeLaney alleged that Perez, Pickett, and Harrison failed to arrange his transfer within the required period, extending his incarceration. He also alleged that Quinones did not provide a continuous positive airway pressure machine for sleep apnea or a nerve-stimulation device for back pain, and that Stolfi did not remove two infected teeth. He asserted six types of claims: constitutional due-process, deliberate-indifference, and equal-protection claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; medical malpractice; intentional infliction of emotional distress; and wrongful confinement. DeLaney did not oppose the defendants’ motion to dismiss.

Rulings on the Federal Claims

The court found that DeLaney adequately alleged the personal involvement of Perez, Pickett, and Harrison because they acted on his grievance. The court concluded that DeLaney arguably had a protected liberty interest in release to Willard under New York law. However, it held that the availability and use of a prior proceeding to correct his confinement supplied a meaningful remedy for the alleged random error in calculating his release date.

The court also held that Perez, Pickett, and Harrison were protected by qualified immunity. Qualified immunity generally protects government officials from liability unless they violate a clearly established right. The court said the applicable due-process right was not clearly defined and that a reasonably competent official could have interpreted the mistaken classification form as requiring DeLaney to remain in custody. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss the due-process claim.

The court held that DeLaney had not alleged sufficiently serious medical harm to support a deliberate-indifference claim. His complaint alleged pain and suffering but did not identify actual medical consequences from the denial of treatment. The court granted the motion to dismiss that claim and granted leave to replead if DeLaney could identify specific consequences involving sufficiently serious medical needs.

The court dismissed the equal-protection claim without prejudice because DeLaney did not identify a similarly situated person who received different treatment. The court also dismissed the emotional-distress claim without prejudice because the allegations did not show intentional conduct designed to cause severe emotional distress or conduct extreme enough to support that claim.

State-Law Claims and Disposition

The court dismissed the medical-malpractice claim without prejudice. DeLaney did not allege facts showing that the treatment decisions departed from accepted medical standards, and he did not describe his injuries beyond pain and suffering. The court dismissed the wrongful-confinement claim with prejudice because qualified immunity protected Perez, Pickett, and Harrison for the same reasons discussed concerning the due-process claim.

In its conclusion, the court granted with prejudice the motion to dismiss DeLaney’s due-process and wrongful-confinement claims against Perez, Pickett, and Harrison. It granted without prejudice the motion to dismiss the claims against Stolfi and Quinones and allowed DeLaney to file an amended complaint by August 31, 2021. The court warned that if he did not timely amend or request an extension, the remaining claims could be dismissed with prejudice and the case terminated. The clerk was directed to terminate the motion and mail the opinion to DeLaney, who was proceeding without a lawyer.