S.M. v. The City of New York

Background

S.M., a minor in the foster-care system, sued the City of New York and Good Shepherd Services under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. She alleged that the defendants violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights and rights under the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 (AACWA) by keeping her for five months at Euphrasian, a facility intended for short-term stays by female adolescents in crisis. She also asserted New York-law claims concerning foster-care placement and negligent placement and supervision.

According to the complaint, S.M. was placed at Euphrasian after entering the custody of the City’s Administration for Children’s Services. Four months after a Good Shepherd evaluation recommended moving her to a therapeutic foster home, she remained at Euphrasian. She alleged that her movement was restricted, her education and therapy were disrupted, and she was bullied, harassed, and threatened by other residents. She further alleged that the stay caused post-traumatic stress disorder, nightmares, anxiety, phobias, isolation, and other harms.

The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. They argued that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the case, that Section 1983 claims required individually named defendants, that S.M. had not plausibly alleged a municipal policy or custom, that Good Shepherd was not a state actor, that the alleged conduct did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment, that the AACWA provisions did not create enforceable rights, and that the state-law claims should be dismissed or declined under supplemental jurisdiction.

Court’s analysis

The court held that Rooker-Feldman did not apply because S.M. challenged conduct by those responsible for her at Euphrasian, not the New York Family Court’s decision placing her in the City’s care. The court also rejected the argument that individually named defendants were required for a Section 1983 claim against the City.

The court found S.M.’s allegations sufficient at the dismissal stage to support an inference that the City had an official policy or custom of placing children in facilities unsuitable for their needs. The court also held that Good Shepherd qualified as a state actor under binding Second Circuit precedent concerning foster-care providers, even though the court expressed reservations about that precedent’s reasoning.

The court found S.M.’s Fourteenth Amendment allegations plausible. It explained that a child in state custody has a right to protection from harm, including unreasonable and unnecessary intrusions into emotional well-being, and that S.M.’s allegations about the length of her placement, threats to her physical safety, and resulting trauma were sufficient to allow discovery.

Regarding the AACWA, the court held that Sections 671(a)(16) and 675(5) create federal rights enforceable through Section 1983. Those rights include the creation of a case plan and a plan designed to achieve placement in a safe, least restrictive, most family-like, and appropriate setting consistent with the child’s best interests and special needs.

The court reached a different conclusion about Sections 675(1) and 671(a)(22). It held that Section 675(1) was too focused on general definitions, discussions, and goals, and was too unclear for judicial enforcement. It held that Section 671(a)(22)’s requirement for “quality services” was also too vague and dependent on child-specific facts to create an enforceable federal right. Claims under both sections were therefore dismissed.

The court retained supplemental jurisdiction over the New York claims because they arose from the same facts as the surviving federal claims. It held that S.M.’s claims under specified New York foster-care regulations and her negligent-placement and supervision claims could proceed.

Disposition

The City of New York and Good Shepherd Services’ motions to dismiss were granted with respect to the claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 675(1) and 671(a)(22). In all other respects, the motions were denied. Defendants were ordered to file answers to the remaining claims within 21 days after the opinion and order.