Goldberg v. New York

Background

Anwyn Goldberg and Solomon Watkins brought claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 and New York law against the City of New York, New York City Police Department Officer Ryan Mclasky, and unknown NYPD officers. They alleged that defendants violated their rights during their February 12, 2018 arrests and subsequent criminal prosecutions. The claims included false arrest and false imprisonment, assault and battery, excessive force, malicious prosecution, failure to intervene, malicious abuse of process, negligent hiring and supervision, and municipal liability.

The opinion states that Mclasky saw the group with Keiffer Braisted near a Bank of America building. Mclasky testified that he saw Braisted write graffiti and that Goldberg and Watkins shielded him and looked up and down the street. After Mclasky and another officer approached, several people fled. Watkins struggled while Mclasky tried to arrest him, and Goldberg sprayed pepper spray toward Mclasky’s face. Goldberg and Watkins were arrested, detained overnight, and charged with assault in the second degree, obstructing governmental administration in the second degree, resisting arrest, and criminal mischief in the fourth degree. The charges were dismissed on September 5, 2018, under speedy-trial provisions.

During briefing and oral argument on the summary-judgment motions, plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their municipal-liability claim and Goldberg dismissed her excessive-force claim. The claims remaining at that stage included false arrest and false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, failure to intervene, and Watkins’s excessive-force claim.

Motions and ruling

Defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence leaves any material factual dispute requiring a trial and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs filed a cross-motion for partial summary judgment on their false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and malicious-prosecution claims.

The court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs’ remaining claims. The court denied plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment.

Court’s reasoning

Probable cause and the arrest-related claims. Probable cause exists when the known facts would lead an objectively reasonable officer to believe that a person probably committed a crime. The court found probable cause to arrest Goldberg and Watkins based on their proximity to Braisted, their conduct while he was writing graffiti, their continued movement with him afterward, and the later events involving Watkins’s resistance and Goldberg’s pepper spray. The court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that their lack of knowledge that Mclasky was a police officer defeated probable cause, explaining that their subjective understanding did not control the objective assessment.

Because probable cause justified the arrests, the court held that it completely defeated the false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims. The court also held that probable cause defeated the malicious-prosecution claim, which required plaintiffs to show, among other things, that the criminal proceedings lacked probable cause.

Malicious abuse of process. Plaintiffs argued that Mclasky used their arrests and prosecutions to pressure Braisted, whom they described as the true suspect, to surrender. The court held that plaintiffs presented no evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Mclasky acted for a collateral purpose outside the legitimate aims of law enforcement. The abuse-of-process claim therefore failed.

Failure to intervene. The court held that plaintiffs did not initially identify which defendant allegedly failed to intervene. Although plaintiffs later identified Officer Esposito, the court concluded that the claim still failed as a matter of law under the theory presented.

Watkins’s excessive-force claim. The court analyzed the claim under the Fourth Amendment’s objective-reasonableness standard. Viewing the evidence in Watkins’s favor, it found that Mclasky used reasonable force because Watkins struggled when Mclasky grabbed him, Mclasky used his weight to bring him to the ground, and Goldberg sprayed pepper spray toward Mclasky’s face. The court also found that Watkins’s minor scratches and split lip were not sufficiently serious or harmful to support a constitutional excessive-force claim. The court therefore held that this claim failed on the merits.

Disposition

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ cross-motion for partial summary judgment was DENIED. The order directed the Clerk of Court to close the motions. The opinion does not add a “with prejudice” or “without prejudice” qualification to either ruling.