Ragland v. City of New York

Background

Michael Ragland brought claims under federal civil-rights statutes and New York law against the City of New York and Police Officer Brian Wilkens. The claims arose from Ragland’s April 15, 2019 arrest for fraudulent accosting under New York Penal Law § 165.30(1). Ragland alleged that the defendants lacked probable cause to arrest him.

The court had previously denied the defendants’ first summary-judgment motion on claims for unlawful search and seizure, false arrest and false imprisonment, assault and battery, and failure to intervene. The court had granted that earlier motion on other claims, including malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, excessive force, denial of a fair trial, deprivation of rights, denial of equal protection, negligent hiring, training, retention, and supervision, and municipal liability.

Second Summary-Judgment Motion

Summary judgment is a decision without a trial that is appropriate only when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact important to the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

The defendants argued that Officer Wilkens’s deposition testimony established probable cause to arrest Ragland for fraudulent accosting. The court disagreed that summary judgment was appropriate. It found a genuine factual dispute about whether Ragland initiated contact with the passengers, as required for the “accosting” element of the offense. Ragland said the passengers approached him and asked for help, while Officer Wilkens said he saw Ragland approach them to help hail a cab and solicit payment.

Because probable cause depended on disputed facts and competing accounts, the court held that the issue was for a jury. The court also found that the disputed facts required a trial on whether Officer Wilkens was entitled to qualified immunity, which can protect a government official when the official’s conduct was not objectively unreasonable under clearly established law. The court likewise held that summary judgment was inappropriate on the assault-and-battery claim because the probable-cause dispute affected whether force used during the arrest, including handcuffing, was lawful.

Disposition

The court denied the defendants’ second motion for summary judgment on Ragland’s claims for unlawful search and seizure, false arrest and false imprisonment, and assault and battery. The court also denied the motion as to the related qualified-immunity issue. Ragland’s failure-to-intervene claim was dismissed after his counsel stated at oral argument that he was abandoning it. The clerk was instructed to close the open motion at ECF No. 73.