Zlotnick v. Crystal Run Village, Inc.

Background

Michael Zlotnick, acting as administrator of the Estate of Steven Zlotnick, sued Crystal Run Village, Inc., Robin Cohen, Christopher Fortune, and unidentified defendants. The claims arose from Steven Zlotnick’s death on February 6, 2019, while he lived at Crystal Run Village, a residential care facility. The complaint alleged that Steven had multiple intellectual and developmental disabilities, was non-verbal, had serious eating and choking risks, and was supposed to receive constant or one-on-one supervision around food.

The complaint alleged that, on the day of Steven’s death, bread was left unsecured at the facility. Robin Cohen was the only employee present when Steven returned with other residents. Cohen allegedly left Steven alone while assisting another resident, then tried to take bread from Steven after finding him with it. Steven began choking, and he later died after emergency efforts to revive him. The complaint attributed the death to alleged failures to train and supervise staff, secure food, follow safety plans, maintain adequate staffing, and respond to earlier choking incidents.

Claims and Motions

The plaintiff asserted claims under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Sections 3604(f)(2) and 3617 of the Fair Housing Act, the New York Human Rights Law, common-law negligence, and New York’s wrongful-death statute. Defendants moved to dismiss the federal claims for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint adequately alleges a legally recognized claim. They moved to dismiss the state claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), which concerns the court’s power to hear a claim.

Rehabilitation Act Claims

The court dismissed the Rehabilitation Act claims against Cohen and Fortune because individuals cannot be held personally liable under that statute. The plaintiff had conceded that those claims should be dismissed.

The court also dismissed the Rehabilitation Act claim against the institutional defendants for failure to state a claim. The court explained that the complaint alleged inadequate care, poor supervision, understaffing, and negligence, but did not allege facts showing that Steven was denied benefits because of disability, treated worse than other residents because of disability, or subjected to discriminatory conduct. The alleged services—including supervision and protection from food-related dangers—were services provided because of Steven’s disabilities. In the court’s view, challenging the quality of those services was not the same as alleging disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act.

The court likewise rejected the reasonable-accommodation theory because the alleged accommodations were the same care and services the defendants were responsible for providing. The court found no pleaded facts showing discriminatory intent or deliberate indifference based on disability.

Fair Housing Act Claims

The court treated the Fair Housing Act allegations as potentially involving post-acquisition conduct—conduct occurring after a person obtained housing—but held that the complaint still failed to plead discrimination. It found no sufficient facts showing discriminatory animus, a disproportionate effect on disabled people, or a refusal to provide a reasonable accommodation.

The court also rejected the hostile-housing-environment theory. Although the complaint alleged that Steven faced serious dangers in the facility, it did not allege facts showing that defendants created that environment because of disability. The court viewed the alleged failures as, at most, negligence or inadequate care. It also concluded that the episode in which staff physically tried to remove food from Steven’s mouth did not, as pleaded, show punishment or a hostile assault; the allegations described attempts to prevent choking.

The Section 3617 retaliation claim was dismissed because the complaint did not allege that Steven engaged in protected activity, that defendants knew about it, or that defendants took adverse action for a retaliatory reason. The court stated that the complaint appeared to use the retaliation provision to assert discrimination and contained no retaliation allegations.

State-Law Claims and Leave to Amend

Because the court dismissed all federal claims, it concluded that it could not exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the authority to hear related state-law claims—over the New York Human Rights Law, negligence, and wrongful-death claims. Those claims were therefore also dismissed.

The court did not immediately end the matter. Although the plaintiff had not requested permission to amend, the court granted him 30 days to file a second amended complaint if he chose to do so. The order stated that after 30 days, the existing amended complaint shall be dismissed.

Disposition

Judge Paul E. Davison granted defendants’ motion to dismiss, terminated the motion at docket entry 29, and granted the plaintiff 30 days to file a second amended complaint. The opinion does not state that the dismissal was with or without prejudice.