Patterson v. Patterson

Background

Shawn J. Patterson, representing himself and proceeding without paying filing fees, brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 concerning the seizure of his dogs in March 2020. The defendants included employees or officials associated with the Town of Woodbury, Gene Heck, and Patterson’s father, Shawn Patterson Sr., whom the opinion describes as Patterson’s landlord and the titled owner of the residence.

On or about March 11, 2020, the Town Defendants arrived at Patterson’s apartment after Patterson Sr. contacted authorities to have Patterson’s eighteen dogs removed. Patterson Sr. signed a form consenting to a search and another form surrendering the dogs to the Town of Woodbury. The dogs were removed and taken to the Hudson Valley SPCA. Patterson was later told that he would need ownership, vaccination, and town-certification documents to retrieve them, but he was advised on March 16, 2020, that he would not be getting the dogs back.

Patterson filed this action on or about March 24, 2020. On or about June 9, 2020, after the action began, he transferred ownership of the eighteen dogs to a trust. Patterson claimed that he was the trust’s beneficiary, but he did not provide the trust agreement.

Town Defendants’ Motion

The Town Defendants moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is entered when the evidence shows that there is no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

The court first addressed whether Patterson had standing to maintain the action. It explained that a trust beneficiary ordinarily does not own property held in trust and that the trustee is ordinarily the proper person to sue to recover trust property. Patterson had not joined the trust or trustee, sought ratification, or sought substitution under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17. The court also found that Patterson had not shown that he had demanded that the trustee bring the lawsuit and that the trustee had unjustifiably refused, or that making such a demand would have been futile.

The court held that Patterson’s statements about trying to contact the trustee were incomplete and unsupported. Because Patterson did not establish a genuine factual dispute concerning his ability to maintain the action, the Town Defendants were entitled to summary judgment. The court dismissed Patterson’s § 1983 claims against the Town Defendants and did not address their remaining arguments for summary judgment.

Heck and Patterson Sr.

Heck did not appear in the action and did not join the Town Defendants’ motion. The court nevertheless addressed standing as to the claims against him. The court also stated that Patterson Sr. was a private party who did not work for a state or governmental body and therefore could not be liable under § 1983, which generally applies to conduct carried out under state authority.

The court dismissed Patterson’s claims against Heck and Patterson Sr. under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a statute requiring dismissal of certain claims brought by a person proceeding without paying filing fees.

Disposition

The court granted the Town Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissed the claims against Patterson Sr. and Heck, dismissed the amended complaint, directed the clerk to close the case, and stated that the dismissal was without prejudice because the standing issue did not concern the merits of Patterson’s claims.