Nnebe v. Daus

Background

The consolidated cases challenge the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission’s practice of summarily suspending licensed taxi drivers after arrests for felonies or specified misdemeanors. The plaintiffs alleged that the suspension notices and post-suspension hearing procedures violated procedural due process under the United States Constitution, as well as state and city law.

Earlier rulings had addressed the constitutionality of the process. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the post-suspension process had to give drivers a meaningful opportunity to show that their particular continued licensure did not threaten public safety. It also held that the notices used during the relevant periods were constitutionally inadequate. The defendants later changed the Rule and notices, and the district court previously found that the revised procedures generally satisfied constitutional requirements, except for a timeline that the defendants later updated.

Class Proposed by Plaintiffs

The plaintiffs sought certification of a class consisting of all Taxi and Limousine Commission-licensed drivers whose licenses were suspended based on an arrest on a criminal charge between June 28, 2003, and the present, or until the defendants implemented the court-ordered process. They sought certification for liability, compensatory and other damages, and injunctive relief. They also asked the court to appoint Jonathan Nnebe, Eduardo Avenaut, Khairul Amin, Anthony Stallworth, Parichay Barman, and Noor Tani as class representatives, and Daniel Ackman, Shannon Liss-Riordan, and David T. Goldberg as class counsel.

Liability Class

The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not supported certification of a class covering both liability and damages. Their motion contained little evidence, and the proposed damages claims involved more than 20,000 potential class members with materially different circumstances.

The court nevertheless concluded that the requirements for a liability class were satisfied. The central liability question—whether the Commission’s notice and post-suspension hearing procedures were constitutionally inadequate during the class period—was common to the class. The court found that common issues predominated over individualized issues as to liability, that the class was manageable, and that a class action was a superior way to address the alleged common violation. It relied in part on the fact that the defendants’ procedures had already been found constitutionally deficient and that the Commission maintained records capable of identifying affected drivers.

The court also found that the class was ascertainable, because Commission records could identify drivers whose licenses were suspended after arrests. The approximately 20,000-member class satisfied the numerosity requirement. Commonality and typicality were satisfied because the named plaintiffs’ claims arose from the same notice and hearing procedures. Although the court expressed concern about the plaintiffs’ failure to provide declarations or affidavits addressing the representatives’ continuing interest, it found adequacy satisfied for a liability class. The court also found the proposed class counsel adequate based on their experience and involvement in the litigation.

Damages

The court held that compensatory damages could not be resolved on a classwide basis. For each driver, an individualized proceeding would be needed to determine whether adequate procedures would have produced a different suspension outcome. The court also identified individual issues concerning whether drivers were working when suspended, whether they had other suspensions, whether their licenses had expired, and whether they actually lost income because of the deficient process.

The court rejected the plaintiffs’ proposal to use reinstatement as a general measure of erroneous deprivation because many licenses were reinstated after the underlying criminal matters ended favorably, which did not necessarily show that the suspension had been unjustified earlier. Emotional-distress damages likewise required individual proof that the distress resulted from the denial of adequate process, rather than from the arrest or criminal proceeding. The court stated that nominal damages could be available on a classwide basis for a procedural due-process violation, but compensatory damages would require individualized proceedings. The court also concluded that classwide punitive damages were unavailable on the plaintiffs’ showing.

Injunctive and Other Certification Requests

The court denied certification of an injunctive class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). It found that such certification would have little practical significance because the defendants had stopped using the challenged procedures, implemented updated procedures for all affected drivers, and had already addressed the requested prospective relief through prior litigation. The court also declined to allow the plaintiffs to raise certification under Rule 23(b)(1)(A) at that late stage because they had not previously sought certification on that basis.

Disposition

The court revised the class definition to cover: “All TLC-licensed drivers whose licenses were suspended by the TLC based on the driver having been arrested on a criminal charge any time between June 28, 2003, until February 18, 2020.” It ordered that class certified under Rules 23(a) and 23(b)(3) as to liability only.

The court’s order states that the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification was GRANTED as to the issue of liability and DENIED in all other respects. Jonathan Nnebe, Eduardo Avenaut, Khairul Amin, Anthony Stallworth, Parichay Barman, and Noor Tani were appointed class representatives. Daniel Ackman, Shannon Liss-Riordan, and David T. Goldberg were appointed class counsel. The parties were ordered to prepare a class notice and plan, and to appear for a conference concerning next steps, including how individualized damages hearings would proceed.