Donohue v. Hochul

Background

New York generally required schoolchildren over age two who could medically tolerate face coverings to wear masks in certain settings, including schools. The New York City Department of Education implemented the requirement. The rule included exceptions recommended by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, including an exception for a person who could not wear a mask, or could not safely wear one, because of a disability.

Patrick Donohue, Angela Nolan, and Marie Farrell sued as parents and guardians of disabled schoolchildren. Their children were alleged to have a traumatic brain injury, autism, and a learning disability. The parents alleged that masking interfered with breathing, communication, speech development, or participation in educational services. They sought a declaration that the mask mandate was unlawful and an injunction preventing state and city officials and entities from implementing it. They also moved for a preliminary injunction, which is a temporary order intended to prevent harm while litigation proceeds.

The complaint asserted claims under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the federal law governing emergency authorization of products. It also asserted constitutional claims, claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and state-law and state-constitutional claims. The City Defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing respectively that the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction and that the complaint failed to state a claim.

Standing

The court held that at least Marie Farrell had standing at the early stage of the case. The parties agreed that her daughter, E.F., wore a mask to school, and the complaint alleged that masking worsened E.F.’s communication difficulties and could trigger harmful behaviors. The court concluded that these allegations adequately showed an injury that an injunction could alleviate. Because multiple plaintiffs sought the same relief, the court did not dismiss the action based on the City Defendants’ challenge to Donohue’s standing.

Federal statutory claims

The court dismissed the IDEA claims alleging that the defendants failed to implement the students’ individual education plans (IEPs). The IEPs did not contain provisions stating that the students would not wear masks. The court therefore held that the complaint did not plausibly allege that the defendants failed to implement a substantial or significant IEP provision. It also rejected the related Section 504 claims for the same reasons.

The court separately dismissed the claims under the IDEA’s “stay-put” provision, which generally requires a child to remain in the current educational placement while certain IDEA proceedings are pending. Although the complaint alleged that the parents had initiated IDEA proceedings, the court held that the mask requirement did not change the children’s educational placement. The IEPs did not address masks, and the complaint did not allege changes to the children’s educational programs, classes, services, or level of attention.

The court dismissed the ADA claims because the ADA bars exclusion and discrimination by public entities, not mandatory restraints, and the mask requirement was not a restraint as alleged. It also dismissed the claim based on the Food and Drug Administration’s emergency-use authorization for masks because the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not provide a private right of action to enforce alleged violations of that authorization.

Constitutional claims

The court dismissed the First Amendment claims. It found that statements by Governor Kathleen Hochul at religious institutions concerned vaccination rather than masking and did not plausibly show that the mandate advanced religion. The complaint also did not plausibly connect the mandate to humanism. Other First Amendment theories failed because the rule adequately described the permitted types of face coverings, the alleged “false speech” and “incitement” did not establish a First Amendment violation, and the complaint did not show substantial interference with freedom of association.

The court dismissed the Fourth Amendment claim because requiring students to wear masks did not amount to a seizure. The complaint did not allege physical force, a show of authority restraining liberty, or circumstances that would make a reasonable person believe they were not free to leave. The Eighth Amendment claim also failed because that amendment does not apply without a formal adjudication of guilt, such as a criminal conviction.

The procedural due process claims failed because the mask mandate was legislative in nature: it applied generally and prospectively. The court also found no alleged deprivation of a protected interest in a particular education program or evidence that the students had been excluded from education. The substantive due process claims failed because the mandate did not undermine family integrity or privacy, did not violate a fundamental right to personal or bodily autonomy in these circumstances, did not shock the conscience, and was a reasonable regulation of education and public health. The equal protection claims failed because the complaint did not allege discrimination against a protected class, selective enforcement, or a valid “class of one” theory. The court also dismissed the independent claims under the Ninth Amendment, Section 1983, and the municipal-liability doctrine associated with Monell because the plaintiffs had not identified a constitutional deprivation.

State claims and preliminary injunction

The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law and state-constitutional claims. Those claims alleged that the mask mandate exceeded state statutory authority, violated New York Education Law § 313, and violated the New York Constitution. The court dismissed them without prejudice because the federal claims had been eliminated early in the case and the state claims could be brought in state court.

Judge Oetken denied the motion for a preliminary injunction because the plaintiffs had not stated a federal claim and therefore could not show a likelihood of success on the merits. In the conclusion, the court granted the City Defendants’ motion to dismiss, dismissed the complaint in its entirety, dismissed the federal claims with prejudice because amendment would be futile, dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice to refiling in state court, denied the preliminary-injunction motion, and closed the case.