Percy v. State of New York

Background

Violene Percy sued Local 412 of the CSEA, Inc. (CSEA) and Basil Townsend under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the New York State Human Rights Law. The court had previously dismissed the Hudson Valley Developmental Disabilities Services Office from the action. The motion addressed in this opinion was CSEA’s motion for summary judgment, which asks whether the evidence presents a genuine dispute requiring a trial.

CSEA is a labor union representing employees in a bargaining unit for the New York State Office for People with Developmental Disabilities. Percy worked for the State at the Hudson Valley Developmental Disabilities Services Office and was a CSEA member who was elected as a delegate. She attended union meetings and conventions, but CSEA did not pay her a salary, provide benefits, or issue employee tax statements. CSEA reimbursed her travel and other expenses.

In January 2014, a developmentally disabled consumer identified as RT left the residence where Percy worked. Percy reported that another consumer, identified as FP, had left because she did not want to lose her job. After an investigation, the State charged Percy with five acts of misconduct, sought to terminate her employment, and suspended her without pay. CSEA representatives assisted her during the disciplinary process. At an expedited resolution meeting, Percy was told that she could request a one-day hearing, proceed to a full arbitration, or resign. She resigned and signed a form acknowledging her rights to refuse the resignation, pursue arbitration, and obtain representation from CSEA or private counsel.

Issues and Analysis

Whether CSEA was Percy’s employer

The court held that no reasonable juror could find that CSEA was Percy’s employer under Title VII or the New York State Human Rights Law. The court applied the requirement that an employment relationship ordinarily involves hiring and remuneration—payment or a significant employment-related benefit. Percy was elected as a delegate rather than hired, and she received no salary or benefits from CSEA. The court also concluded that her union duties were responsibilities, not employment benefits, and that travel reimbursement was not substantial enough to establish an employment relationship. Potential access to benefits listed on CSEA’s website did not satisfy the requirement because Percy did not show that she received or was promised those benefits.

Whether CSEA could be sued as a labor organization

The court rejected CSEA’s argument that Percy’s claims were facially deficient simply because CSEA was not her employer. Title VII also regulates labor organizations. The court concluded that Percy’s charge filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and her amended complaint alleged that CSEA failed to represent her properly during disciplinary proceedings after she made sexual-harassment allegations. The court therefore analyzed her claims against CSEA as claims against a labor organization.

Title VII discrimination

For a Title VII claim against a union, Percy had to show that CSEA breached its duty of fair representation and that the breach was connected to unlawful discrimination. A breach requires conduct toward a member that is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith.

Percy identified three alleged failures: Townsend did not represent her at the expedited resolution meeting as he had represented others; CSEA did not file a petition for her; and CSEA presented her with a choice between resigning and fighting the charges while potentially facing criminal charges. The court held that these allegations did not establish a breach of the duty of fair representation. Percy was represented at the meeting by CSEA labor relations specialist Pamela Alexander, and Percy did not show that Alexander’s representation was deficient or that Townsend’s participation would have changed the result. The collective bargaining agreement entitled her to CSEA or private-counsel representation but did not require CSEA’s president to represent every member.

The court also held that Percy did not provide evidence of discriminatory motivation. The two employees she identified as comparators were her subordinates, faced somewhat different charges, and claimed they had followed her orders. The court found that they were not similarly situated in all material respects. Percy also did not provide evidence that CSEA’s alleged refusal to file a petition or its advice about her options was motivated by her rejection of Townsend’s alleged sexual advances. The court granted CSEA summary judgment on the Title VII discrimination claim.

Title VII retaliation

To establish retaliation, Percy had to show protected activity under Title VII, CSEA’s awareness of that activity, an adverse union decision, and a connection between the protected activity and the decision. The court held that Percy failed to show the required causal connection between her rejection of Townsend’s advances and the union actions she challenged. The court noted that Percy identified May 2014 as her last incident with Townsend, while the expedited resolution meeting occurred in September 2014. On the record presented, that timing was not close enough by itself to support an inference of causation, and Percy offered no other sufficient evidence. The court granted CSEA summary judgment on the retaliation claim.

New York State Human Rights Law

The parties did not dispute that the analysis of Percy’s New York State Human Rights Law claims was the same as the Title VII analysis. Because the court found Percy’s Title VII claims deficient, it granted CSEA summary judgment on the state-law claims as well.

Disposition

The court granted CSEA’s motion for summary judgment. It directed the clerk to terminate the motion and terminate Local 412 of the CSEA, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME AFL-CIO from the action. The opinion directed the remaining parties to appear for a telephonic pretrial conference on April 22, 2022.