Swanhart v. State of New York

Background

Bryan Swanhart, Desiree Bartholomew, and Joyce Swanhart sued the State of New York, the New York State Police, George P. Beach II, Trooper Kyle Jackson, and John Doe Officers 1-5. The plaintiffs asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986, along with state-law claims.

The complaint alleged that Bryan Swanhart had a seizure while driving and then was involved in a car accident. The plaintiffs alleged that Trooper Jackson shook and slapped him, failed to provide appropriate medical assistance, required or caused his blood to be drawn without consent, obtained and disclosed his medical information, falsely arrested and charged him, restricted Bartholomew’s and Joyce Swanhart’s access to him while he was hospitalized, and tampered with evidence during the criminal case. The criminal charges were later dismissed and sealed.

The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which addresses subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rule 12(b)(6), which addresses whether a complaint adequately states a legal claim.

Rulings on the Claims

The court held that the Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity barred the damages claims against the State of New York, the New York State Police, and the individual defendants sued in their official capacities. The court dismissed all federal and state claims against those defendants with prejudice. The plaintiffs conceded that these claims should be dismissed.

The court dismissed the conspiracy claims against George P. Beach II, Trooper Kyle Jackson, and John Does 1-4 in their individual capacities without prejudice. It applied the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, which generally treats officers and employees of one entity acting within the scope of their employment as legally incapable of conspiring with one another. The court found that the complaint did not allege an independent personal stake that would support an exception to that doctrine.

The court dismissed all federal claims against Superintendent Beach and John Does 2-4 in their individual capacities without prejudice because the complaint did not adequately allege their personal involvement. The court found that the complaint relied mainly on general allegations that all defendants were responsible and conclusory allegations that Beach created policies or supervised subordinate officers.

The court dismissed the excessive-force claims against Trooper Jackson and Jane Doe 1 without prejudice. It held that the complaint did not provide enough information about the timing, number, or circumstances of the alleged shaking and slapping, or whether the force caused an injury, to determine whether the force was more than minimal and objectively unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court also found that the complaint did not adequately allege Jane Doe 1’s personal involvement or that she had a reasonable opportunity to intervene.

The court dismissed Bryan Swanhart’s false-arrest and false-imprisonment claims against Trooper Jackson and Jane Doe 1 without prejudice. It reasoned that the allegations suggested Trooper Jackson had probable cause to arrest Bryan Swanhart for driving while impaired by drugs, based on information about his medication, his medical information, and the blood-test results. The later dismissal and sealing of the criminal charges did not eliminate probable cause. The claims against Jane Doe 1 also failed because the complaint did not adequately allege her personal involvement in the arrest.

The court dismissed the federal malicious-prosecution claims against Trooper Jackson and Jane Doe 1 without prejudice. It again relied on the allegations suggesting probable cause and found that the complaint did not allege that either officer played an active role in the later criminal prosecution.

The court dismissed the familial-association claims against Trooper Jackson and Jane Doe 1 without prejudice. It held that the alleged temporary restriction on Bartholomew’s and Joyce Swanhart’s access to Bryan Swanhart during the investigation was not adequately alleged to be shocking, arbitrary, or egregious. The complaint also failed to allege Jane Doe 1’s personal involvement.

The court stated that the complaint did not actually allege a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. It also dismissed the § 1986 claims because those claims must be based on a valid § 1985 claim, and the court had dismissed the § 1985 conspiracy claims.

State-Law Claims and Disposition

Because all federal claims were dismissed, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the federal court’s authority to hear related state-law claims arising from the same events—over the state-law claims. The court therefore dismissed the entire complaint.

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. It dismissed the federal and state claims against New York State, the New York State Police, and the individual defendants in their official capacities with prejudice. It dismissed the remaining federal and state claims against the individual defendants in their individual capacities without prejudice.

The plaintiffs had also filed a motion to amend or correct the complaint. The court denied that motion as procedurally deficient because the plaintiffs did not comply with the court’s individual-practice requirement for a pre-motion letter and conference. However, the court granted the plaintiffs leave to file an amended complaint as to claims dismissed without prejudice. The deadline was May 20, 2022. The court stated that, if no amended complaint was timely filed and the plaintiffs could not show good cause, claims dismissed without prejudice could be deemed dismissed with prejudice.