Pierre-Louis v. United States

Background

Grevy Gerard Pierre-Louis pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit sex trafficking and one count of conspiring to transport minors across state lines for prostitution. On April 17, 2019, the court sentenced him to 360 months in prison. He later filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, a procedure allowing a federal prisoner to challenge a sentence on specified legal grounds.

Pierre-Louis claimed that his guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary because his plea lawyer, James Branden, allegedly promised that he would receive no more than 15 years in prison and told him to agree with whatever the court asked during the plea hearing. He also claimed that sentencing lawyers Connor McNamara and Russ Kofman failed to file a notice of appeal even though he asked them to do so. Finally, he argued that the court violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(j) by failing to properly advise him about his right to appeal.

Ineffective-assistance claims concerning the plea

The court applied the standard for ineffective assistance of counsel. Pierre-Louis had to show both that his lawyers’ performance fell below reasonable professional standards and that the alleged errors caused prejudice, meaning a reasonable probability that the proceeding would have ended differently.

The court rejected Pierre-Louis’s claim that Branden promised him a sentence capped at 15 years. Branden’s sworn declaration denied making that promise and described discussions and plea offers showing that Pierre-Louis’s sentencing exposure was substantially greater. The plea transcript also contradicted Pierre-Louis’s account. During the sworn plea hearing, Pierre-Louis acknowledged that he could receive a life sentence, that the court was not bound by the stipulated sentencing range, that no one had promised him a particular sentence, and that he understood he could go to trial.

The court likewise rejected Pierre-Louis’s claim that Branden told him simply to answer every question affirmatively. Branden stated that he instructed Pierre-Louis to listen and answer truthfully, and the transcript showed that Pierre-Louis gave narrative answers and responded differently to different questions. The court concluded that the plea record established that Pierre-Louis entered his plea knowingly and voluntarily.

Failure-to-appeal claim

The court recognized that a lawyer generally provides ineffective assistance by ignoring a defendant’s specific instruction to file a notice of appeal, even if the defendant waived appellate rights in a plea agreement. But Pierre-Louis had the burden of proving that he timely instructed counsel to appeal and that counsel failed to follow that instruction.

The court found that Pierre-Louis did not make that showing. McNamara and Kofman each submitted sworn statements denying that Pierre-Louis directed them to file an appeal. The court also relied on Pierre-Louis’s pro se motion filed less than a week after sentencing, which challenged his sentencing guidelines but did not mention an appeal, claim that counsel had refused to file one, or request new counsel for an appeal. The court viewed the written record and Pierre-Louis’s later account as contradicting his claim.

Rule 32 and appeal rights

Rule 32(j)(1) requires a sentencing court to advise a defendant of any right to appeal the sentence. The court explained that the rule does not require advice about a right that does not exist because the defendant validly waived it.

The court found that Pierre-Louis’s plea agreement contained an appellate waiver. During the plea proceeding, the court explained the waiver, and at sentencing it reminded Pierre-Louis that he had waived his appellate rights. The government also confirmed that the waiver covered the prison term, supervised release, restitution, and specified forfeiture. The court therefore concluded that it was not required to tell Pierre-Louis that he had a right to appeal his sentence. It added that, even if the court had made an error under Rule 32, the error would have been harmless because Pierre-Louis had waived his appellate rights.

Disposition

Judge Colleen McMahon denied Pierre-Louis’s motion for relief under § 2255 and determined that no hearing was necessary. The court also found that Pierre-Louis had not made the required substantial showing that a federal right was denied, so it declined to issue a certificate of appealability. Finally, the court found that any appeal from its order would not be taken in good faith.