Keesh v. Quick
- Philip Halpern
- 7:19-cv-08942
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 20
In Keesh v. Quick, Judge Halpern granted Bodge summary judgment, denied amendment and recusal, and left Keesh’s retaliation claim for trial.
The ruling ended Tyheem Y. Keesh’s claims against B. Bodge by dismissing them with prejudice, while leaving Keesh’s retaliation claim against J.P. Franco for trial. It also denied Keesh’s requests to amend the complaint and for Judge Halpern’s recusal.
What happened
In Keesh v. Quick, Tyheem Y. Keesh claimed that Correction Lieutenant B. Bodge violated his religious rights by imposing a 20-day loss of packages and commissary privileges, which Keesh said prevented him from following his vegan religious diet. The case also included a retaliation claim against Correction Officer J.P. Franco.
The court ruled that Keesh did not provide evidence that Bodge knew the penalty would interfere with Keesh’s religious practices or that Bodge was responsible for food services. The court therefore granted summary judgment for Bodge on Keesh’s religious-rights claims. It did not decide whether Keesh’s beliefs were sincerely religious or whether earlier proceedings barred his claims.
Judge Halpern denied Keesh’s requests to amend the complaint and for the judge’s recusal. The claim against Bodge was dismissed with prejudice, while Keesh’s retaliation claim against Franco was allowed to proceed to trial.
The detailed version
- Keesh v. Quick · No. 7:19-cv-08942
- Philip Halpern
- June 15, 2022
Background
Tyheem Y. Keesh brought claims under federal civil-rights laws, including 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, the First, Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. After an earlier order dismissed most claims with prejudice, two matters remained: a retaliation claim against J.P. Franco concerning an August 4, 2018 misbehavior report, and claims against B. Bodge under the First Amendment’s protection for religious exercise and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act.
Bodge, a DOCCS corrections lieutenant and hearing officer, found Keesh guilty after a disciplinary hearing and imposed a 20-day penalty that included the loss of recreation, packages, phone, commissary, and personal television. Keesh practiced a religion he founded called Tulukeesh, which included a mostly vegan dietary restriction. Keesh testified that he could ordinarily obtain the needed food through commissary or packages, but during the penalty period he could not do so. He refused the provided food trays because he was concerned about cross-contamination and later changed his religion.
Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on behalf of Bodge. They argued that Keesh could not show Bodge’s personal involvement, that Keesh’s veganism was not a sincerely held religious belief, and that earlier litigation barred his dietary claims. Keesh also requested permission to amend his complaint and sought Judge Halpern’s recusal.
Summary-judgment ruling
Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. For a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must show that the defendant personally participated in the alleged constitutional violation. The court also treated personal involvement as necessary for the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act claim. The court noted that the statute does not allow money damages against defendants in their individual capacities, but it did not rely on that alternative ground in resolving the motion.
The court held that Keesh established Bodge’s direct role in imposing the 20-day loss of packages and commissary privileges. But the record did not show that Bodge knew or had reason to know that the penalty would burden Keesh’s religious practice, that Bodge knew of a resulting violation, or that Bodge was responsible for commissary or food services. Keesh’s new allegations in his opposition affirmation were unsupported and were not included in his complaint or deposition testimony. The court concluded that imposing the penalty as a hearing officer, without evidence of knowledge of its effect on Keesh’s religious diet, did not establish personal involvement in the alleged religious-rights violation.
The court therefore granted Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment as to Bodge. It expressly did not reach Defendants’ arguments about whether Keesh held a sincere religious belief or whether collateral estoppel barred the claims.
Requests to amend and for recusal
The court denied Keesh’s request to amend the complaint. It found that the request was procedurally improper because it was made in opposition papers and that the proposed amendment would merely restate claims and defendants previously dismissed with prejudice. The court also found the request untimely and futile because Keesh identified no new facts that would cure the earlier deficiencies.
The court denied Keesh’s request for recusal. It found the request untimely and concluded that Keesh’s allegations that the court had acted because of racial or religious bias were conclusory, speculative, and unsupported. The court held that its prior rulings against Keesh did not themselves establish bias or provide a basis for recusal.
Disposition
The court’s conclusion states that the motion for summary judgment was granted and that Keesh’s claim for relief against Bodge was dismissed with prejudice. Keesh’s motions for leave to amend and for recusal were denied. His sole remaining claim, retaliation against Franco concerning the August 4, 2018 misbehavior report, was to proceed to trial.
Read the full 20-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.