Johnson v. Brown

Background

Angelo D. Johnson, representing himself, sued Reverend Mary Ann Brown and Rhonda Kosseff-Salchert under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The claims arose from events at Downstate Correctional Facility. Johnson alleged that Brown violated his First Amendment right to practice his Rastafarian religion and that Kosseff-Salchert violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to provide replacement contact lenses.

Johnson entered Downstate on September 10, 2018, with glaucoma, keratitis, and advanced astigmatism. He used prescribed medication and contact lenses. Kosseff-Salchert, a Department of Corrections and Community Supervision physician’s assistant, reviewed his records and referred him to an optometrist. An optometrist examined Johnson on October 18, recommended additional eye testing, and recommended that Johnson be considered for contact lenses at his permanent facility. Kosseff-Salchert submitted requests for the additional tests, but Johnson did not receive replacement contact lenses during his stay at Downstate. He later testified that extended use of the same lenses caused eye pain, infections, and double vision.

Johnson was a Rastafarian when he entered Downstate, but he did not register as a Rastafarian there until October 22, 2018. Downstate held a Negust Day ceremony on October 7. Brown, the facility’s chaplain, did not allow Johnson to attend because he was not registered as a Rastafarian on the date of the ceremony.

Procedural History and Standard

The complaint originally included claims involving 21 other defendants and events at other correctional facilities. The court severed and transferred those claims to the Northern District of New York. The claims against Brown and Kosseff-Salchert proceeded in the Southern District of New York.

The defendants moved for summary judgment. Summary judgment is granted when the evidence shows no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. Johnson did not respond to the motion or the defendants’ statement of facts. The court nevertheless conducted an independent review of the record and considered Johnson’s deposition testimony in light of the special consideration given to people representing themselves.

Eighth Amendment Medical-Care Claim

An Eighth Amendment deliberate-indifference claim requires proof of two elements. First, the medical need or deprivation must be objectively serious. Second, the official must have acted with subjective recklessness—that is, the official must have known about and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm.

The court held that Johnson had not produced evidence creating a genuine dispute that the failure to replace his contact lenses during his approximately six-week stay at Downstate caused an objectively serious constitutional deprivation. Although Johnson testified about eye infections, double vision, and other problems, he did not provide competent evidence showing that his vision deteriorated because of the failure to provide replacement lenses at Downstate. The court distinguished a prior case involving severe vision deterioration after specially prescribed eyeglasses were confiscated.

The court also held that Johnson had not shown deliberate indifference by Kosseff-Salchert. The undisputed evidence showed that she reviewed his records, referred him to an optometrist, and submitted requests for follow-up testing after the optometrist’s examination. The court noted that Kosseff-Salchert was a physician’s assistant rather than an eye specialist and was not authorized to prescribe contact lenses. The court concluded that disagreement with the treatment plan or a preference for different treatment was not enough to establish deliberate indifference. It granted Kosseff-Salchert summary judgment on the Eighth Amendment claim.

First Amendment Religious-Practice Claim

Prisoners retain First Amendment protection for religious practice, although prison restrictions are evaluated under a reasonableness standard that accounts for prison administration and security. An inmate must first show that the challenged conduct substantially burdened sincerely held religious beliefs. If that showing is made, prison officials must identify legitimate interests related to operating the prison, and the inmate may attempt to show that those interests are irrational.

The court assumed, without deciding, that Brown’s conduct substantially burdened Johnson’s religious beliefs. It nevertheless held that the defendants identified legitimate prison interests that Johnson did not rebut. Brown stated that requiring prisoners to register their religion served security interests by preventing prisoners from claiming access to events for which they were not registered. The court also relied on precedent recognizing that religious registration helps prison officials manage movement, determine interest in religious groups, and plan religious accommodations. The court therefore granted Brown summary judgment on the First Amendment claim.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. It directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment for the defendants, mail the opinion and order to Johnson, terminate the motion, and close the case.