Loving v. Superintendent

Background

Franklin Loving, proceeding without a lawyer, sued Robert Morton, the acting superintendent of Downstate Correctional Facility, and Noriel DeGuzman, a physician assistant at that facility. Loving brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which permits claims against state officials for violations of federal rights, and under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). He alleged that, during medical examinations connected with admission to custody, he was directed to remove his clothing down to his underwear. He further alleged that a medical professional opened a curtain, failed to close it after Loving requested privacy, and exposed him in a way that violated his Muslim religious beliefs. Loving sought $100,000 per incident and other relief.

Morton moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). DeGuzman had not been served and did not join the motion. In deciding the motion, the court treated the complaint’s factual allegations as true and viewed reasonable inferences in Loving’s favor, while requiring the allegations to make a plausible claim for relief.

Claims Against Morton

The court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred Loving’s claims for money damages against Morton in his official capacity. The court also held that injunctive relief was unavailable because Loving had been transferred away from Downstate and did not allege that the challenged conduct occurred at his new facility. The court therefore dismissed Morton’s official-capacity claims for both monetary and injunctive relief.

The court rejected one of Loving’s theories of Morton’s personal involvement but accepted another at the pleading stage. Loving could not establish personal involvement merely by alleging that Morton received grievances or complaints. However, Loving alleged that Morton created or enforced a policy requiring the examinations, and Morton’s motion papers did not address that theory. The court therefore held that Loving adequately pleaded Morton’s personal involvement through the alleged policy or custom.

Constitutional Claims

The court construed Loving’s allegations as raising claims under the First, Fourth, and Eighth Amendments, as well as a possible Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection claim.

For the First Amendment free-exercise claim, the court explained that routine searches of incarcerated people generally may serve legitimate prison-safety interests, even when a person’s religion objects to being seen unclothed. Loving did not meaningfully respond to Morton’s argument that the examinations served legitimate purposes, such as assessing health, controlling germs, providing treatment, and determining whether further examinations were needed. The court treated the argument as conceded and abandoned and granted the motion as to the First Amendment claim.

For the Fourth Amendment claim, the court held that Loving did not plausibly allege that the search lacked a legitimate prison-related purpose or was intended to harass, humiliate, or punish him. Loving also did not adequately allege that he was viewed by a guard of the opposite sex or that the alleged searches occurred regularly. His references to searches on “numerous occasions” did not identify their number or the relevant time period. The court therefore granted the motion as to the Fourth Amendment claim.

For the Eighth Amendment claim, the court held that the alleged conduct was not sufficiently serious to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. Loving alleged that he was directed to remove his clothing down to his underwear and was briefly exposed, but he did not allege sexual harassment, excessive force, physical contact, or other sufficiently egregious conduct. The court dismissed the Eighth Amendment claim. The court also concluded that Loving had not alleged an equal-protection violation because he did not identify similarly situated people who were treated differently or otherwise develop such a claim.

RLUIPA and State-Law Claims

The court held that RLUIPA does not authorize monetary damages against state officers in either their official or individual capacities. The only remedy potentially available under RLUIPA in these circumstances was injunctive relief, but Loving did not specifically request it, and his transfer away from Downstate made such relief moot. The court therefore dismissed the RLUIPA claim.

Loving did not address Morton’s argument concerning state-law claims in federal court. The court treated those claims as abandoned and stated that they would fail in any event under New York Correction Law § 24 and related law.

Disposition

The court granted Morton’s motion to dismiss. Because this was the first adjudication of Loving’s claims on the merits and Loving was proceeding without a lawyer, the court dismissed the claims without prejudice and gave him 30 days to file an amended complaint addressing the identified deficiencies. The court warned that failure to meet the deadline could lead to dismissal with prejudice. The court did not decide Morton’s qualified-immunity argument because it found that Loving had not plausibly pleaded entitlement to relief.

As to DeGuzman, the court noted that he had not been served within the required period. It ordered Loving to show cause within 30 days why the claims against DeGuzman should not be dismissed for failure to serve. The court also stated that dismissal of the claims against DeGuzman was proper on the substantive grounds discussed in the opinion, but gave Loving the same 30-day period to show cause why those claims should not be dismissed.