Dubarry v. Capra

Background

Darius Dubarry, Harry Rivera, and Jayquan Griffin, proceeding without lawyers, sued Anthony Annucci, Jeff McKoy, Michael Capra, Leslie Malin, Stephen Brandow, JPay, Inc., and an unserved group identified as members of the New York Department of Corrections and Community Supervision. The plaintiffs brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing lawsuits against people who violate constitutional rights while acting under state authority.

The plaintiffs alleged that prison officials rejected photographs and 30-second videos sent to them through JPay tablet devices. They alleged that the rejections included nude or sexually suggestive material and that they were not notified of the rejections. After filing grievances, receiving a hearing, and appealing to the Central Office Review Committee, the plaintiffs sued. They claimed violations of the First Amendment right to free speech and the Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal protection and due process. They also challenged the prison directives as unconstitutionally vague.

The defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim. The court had previously dismissed the claims and allowed the plaintiffs an opportunity to amend. The court later dismissed the case after the plaintiffs did not timely file an amended complaint, then reopened it after receiving their amended complaint.

First Amendment claim

The court held that the plaintiffs did not state a First Amendment free-speech claim. It relied on Second Circuit decisions upholding prison restrictions on nude, semi-nude, and sexually explicit materials under the four-part test from Turner v. Safley. That test considers whether the restriction is rationally connected to legitimate prison interests, whether prisoners have alternative ways to exercise the right, the effect of accommodation on prison operations, and whether obvious alternatives exist.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs had not added facts distinguishing their claims from those earlier decisions. It rejected the argument that password-protected tablets made the prison’s security concerns irrelevant, reasoning that images or videos could still be voluntarily shared among inmates. The free-speech claim was dismissed.

Equal protection claim

The court dismissed the equal protection claim. To state such a claim, a plaintiff generally must allege that similarly situated people were treated differently because of an impermissible reason. The plaintiffs did not allege that they had been treated differently based on a protected characteristic or another legally impermissible reason. The court also noted that prisoners are not a protected class and that the plaintiffs had not adequately alleged a “class-of-one” claim based on irrationally different treatment.

Due process claim

The court dismissed the due process claim because access to the rejected photographs and videos was not an “atypical and significant hardship” that created a constitutionally protected liberty interest. The court also held that, even assuming such an interest existed, the plaintiffs had received process after learning of the rejections: they filed grievances, received a hearing, appealed, and wrote to a prison official. The court further stated that prisoners do not have a protected liberty interest in the handling of prison grievances.

Vagueness claim

The court treated the plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge as arising under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause rather than the First Amendment. A rule is unconstitutionally vague if ordinary people cannot reasonably understand what it prohibits or if it encourages arbitrary enforcement.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs did not identify specific language in the prison directives that was unclear or encouraged arbitrary enforcement. It also relied on Second Circuit precedent holding that an identical prison policy was not unconstitutionally vague. The vagueness claim was dismissed.

Disposition

Judge Kenneth M. Karas granted the DOCCS Defendants’ motion and JPay’s motion. The court stated that the claims were dismissed with prejudice because this was the second adjudication of the plaintiffs’ claims. The Clerk was directed to terminate the pending motions, mail the opinion to the plaintiffs, and close the case. The court did not reach the defendants’ other dismissal arguments because the claims had already failed on the grounds discussed above.