Billings v. State Of New York

Background

Maureen M. Billings sued the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS), Roger A. Murphy, Paul J. Artuz, and Diane Curra. She alleged discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the First and Fourteenth Amendments through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and New York Executive Law § 296.

Billings alleged that she is a Muslim woman who wears a hijab and has diabetes. She claimed that DOCCS approved her request to wear a hijab subject to safety conditions, but that Murphy and Artuz required her to demonstrate that it could be removed quickly and insisted that she remove it in front of Artuz even though female supervisors were available. She further alleged that she was sent home, removed from the payroll, prevented from returning to work for several months, required to complete medical forms, denied unemployment benefits, and incorrectly marked absent without leave after returning. She also alleged that Curra rejected medical documentation and that a coworker harassed her.

Billings previously amended her complaint after the court dismissed an earlier version without prejudice. The defendants then moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which allows dismissal when a complaint does not state a legally sufficient claim.

Court’s Analysis

Title VII religious-discrimination claim. The court held that being removed from work and the payroll for about seven months could qualify as a materially adverse employment action. But it found that Billings did not plausibly allege that this or any other adverse action occurred because of her religion. The court noted that she did not allege religious comments, a demand that she stop wearing the hijab, or facts connecting her religious accommodation to the decision not to let her return to work. The court also found that the alleged distress from removing her hijab, without a material employment consequence, did not establish an adverse employment action.

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Title VII religious-discrimination claim and dismissed that claim with prejudice.

Title VII retaliation claim. The court accepted that requesting a religious accommodation was protected activity and that extended unpaid leave and certain allegedly inaccurate attendance markings could qualify as adverse actions for retaliation purposes. However, it held that Billings did not plausibly allege a connection between those actions and her accommodation request or later grievances. The court cited the timing of the events, the lack of allegations that Curra knew about the accommodation request or grievances, and Billings’s own allegations that Murphy and Artuz were implementing the approved accommodation conditions.

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Title VII retaliation claim and dismissed that claim with prejudice.

Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Billings alleged that Murphy, Artuz, and Curra violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights through religious discrimination and retaliation. The court applied the same general framework it used for the Title VII claims and held that Billings had not adequately alleged that an adverse employment action was based on her religion.

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the Section 1983 discrimination and retaliation claims and dismissed those claims with prejudice. Because the claims were dismissed on that basis, the court did not decide the defendants’ separate qualified-immunity arguments.

Americans with Disabilities Act claim. Billings alleged that DOCCS and the individual defendants discriminated and retaliated against her because of actual or perceived disabilities, including diabetes and perceived mental illness. The court stated that the defendants conceded, for purposes of the motion, that she had adequately alleged a disability.

The court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred damages claims against DOCCS under Title I of the ADA and that Title I did not permit individual liability against the individual defendants. The court also found that Billings had not pleaded facts showing that the challenged employment actions occurred because of her actual or perceived disability. In particular, the court viewed the alleged errors in her medical forms, the denial of unemployment benefits, and the attendance markings as insufficiently connected to disability-based discrimination. The ADA retaliation claim failed for the same reasons as the Title VII retaliation claim.

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the ADA claim and dismissed it with prejudice.

New York Executive Law § 296 claim. Billings brought state-law religious- and disability-discrimination and retaliation claims against DOCCS. The court held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the claim against the state agency and that the state-law pleading requirements generally matched those under Title VII and the ADA.

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the state-law claim and dismissed it with prejudice. The opinion also notes that Billings consented to dismissal of this claim against the individual defendants.

Request for an injunction. Billings sought orders requiring the defendants to correct legal violations, appoint a different lieutenant to oversee her attendance, and respond in good faith to her workplace-harassment grievances. The court deemed the request abandoned because Billings did not address the defendants’ arguments against it. Alternatively, the court held that the request failed because she had not shown a real and immediate threat of future injury and because some requested orders were vague commands to obey the law. The court also noted that she alleged that DOCCS had already removed nine inaccurate absence entries and did not allege continuing harm from the failure to respond to her earlier grievances.

The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the request for injunctive relief and dismissed that request with prejudice.

Leave to amend and final disposition

The court denied further permission to amend because Billings had already been told about deficiencies in her earlier complaint and had been given an opportunity to correct them. The court concluded that the Second Amended Complaint still failed to address those deficiencies.

The court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss and dismissed the Second Amended Complaint in its entirety without leave to replead. It directed the clerk to enter judgment and close the case.