Guillen v. City of New York

Background

After a traffic stop in Manhattan on January 4, 2018, NYPD officers Jonathan Cannizzaro and Francisco Bardales arrested Edward Guillen. The officers observed that the vehicle’s rear license-plate light was not illuminated, saw Guillen throw a cigarette and a black plastic bag from the vehicle, and recovered a small wooden bat from the driver-side door. Guillen told the officers that he kept the bat for safety or protection. Officer Bardales also recovered a knife from the vehicle.

Guillen was charged with two counts of criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree. The Manhattan District Attorney’s Office later moved to dismiss the charges because it could not prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt, and the criminal court dismissed them on April 11, 2018.

Guillen then sued the City of New York and the two officers. His federal claims included false arrest and false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, malicious abuse of process, denial of equal protection, conspiracy under federal civil-rights statutes, and a claim that the City maintained an unlawful policy or practice. He also asserted related New York state-law claims.

Summary-Judgment Standard

The defendants moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the result and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. The court considered the record, including body-camera footage, deposition testimony, and the parties’ factual statements.

Federal Claims

False arrest and false imprisonment. The court held that the officers had probable cause, or at least arguable probable cause. Probable cause means facts that would lead a reasonable officer to believe an offense had been committed. The court identified three independent grounds:

- The officers observed that the vehicle’s rear license-plate light was not illuminated during nighttime conditions, violating New York Vehicle and Traffic Law section 375(2)(a)(4). The court rejected Guillen’s later unsupported testimony that the light was working. - Body-camera footage showed Guillen throwing a cigarette and a plastic bag onto the ground, giving the officers probable cause to arrest him for littering. - The officers recovered the wooden bat, and Guillen said he possessed it for protection. Based on the officers’ observations, training, and the surrounding facts, the court found it reasonable for them to believe the object was a prohibited billy under New York Penal Law section 265.01(1).

Because probable cause for any arrestable offense defeats a false-arrest claim, the court did not need to decide whether probable cause also existed for the open alcohol container or knife. The court also held that, at minimum, the officers were protected by qualified immunity. Qualified immunity generally protects government officials from damages when their conduct did not violate a clearly established right or when reasonable officers could disagree about whether the conduct was lawful. The court granted summary judgment on the federal false-arrest and false-imprisonment claim.

The court did not construe the complaint as asserting a separate federal unlawful-search claim, so it did not decide the parties’ arguments about the vehicle and personal searches.

Malicious prosecution. The court granted summary judgment on this claim. It found no evidence that Bardales initiated the criminal proceeding: Cannizzaro signed the complaint, and Guillen identified no evidence that Bardales made false or incomplete statements or otherwise acted in bad faith. As to both officers, the court found probable cause to prosecute Guillen for possessing the bat and knife, and no evidence that later-discovered facts undermined that probable cause. The court also found no evidence of actual malice, meaning an improper motive rather than a desire to pursue justice.

Malicious abuse of process. The court granted summary judgment because Guillen offered no evidence supporting his allegation that the officers pursued a collateral objective, such as obtaining overtime or increasing their arrest counts. The court also found no evidence that the officers took action to pursue such an objective after the criminal complaint was issued.

Equal protection and section 1981. Guillen alleged that the officers treated him differently because of race, national origin, ethnicity, religion, or sex. The court found no evidence that similarly situated people were treated differently or that the officers acted with discriminatory intent. It also deemed Guillen’s section 1981 claim abandoned because he did not address it in his opposition to summary judgment, and independently found the claim unsupported. The court granted summary judgment on these claims.

Conspiracy claims. The court granted summary judgment on the claims under sections 1983, 1985, and 1986. For the section 1985 claim, it applied the intracorporate-conspiracy doctrine, which generally treats employees of one entity acting within their employment as a single legal actor unable to conspire with one another. The court found no evidence supporting the personal-stake exception because there was no evidence that the officers acted for personal interests separate from their police duties. The court applied the same reasoning to the section 1983 conspiracy claim and also found no evidence supporting Guillen’s conclusory conspiracy and discrimination allegations. Because a section 1986 claim depends on a viable section 1985 conspiracy claim, the section 1986 claim also failed.

Municipal liability. The court granted summary judgment to the City on Guillen’s section 1983 claim. A municipality may be liable under section 1983 when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation, but a single incident by an employee ordinarily is not enough. The court found that Guillen identified no City policy or custom and offered no evidence that City policymakers adopted or maintained an unconstitutional practice.

Abandoned federal claims. The court deemed Guillen’s excessive-force and failure-to-intervene claims abandoned because he did not address them in his opposition to summary judgment. The record also stated that the officers did not use physical force and that Guillen claimed no physical injury, although the court’s disposition of those claims rested on abandonment.

State Claims and Disposition

After dismissing all federal claims, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Guillen’s New York state-law claims. Supplemental jurisdiction is a federal court’s authority to hear related state-law claims in the same case. The court concluded that judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and respect for state courts favored declining jurisdiction, particularly because the parties disputed whether the state claims were timely.

The court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment, dismissed all federal claims with prejudice, and dismissed the state-law claims without prejudice to filing in state court. It directed the clerk to enter judgment, terminate the motion, and close the case.