Brims v. Collado

Background

Edward Brims, representing himself, filed a federal petition challenging his New York state conviction. A jury found him guilty of two counts of attempted first-degree robbery, attempted second-degree robbery, second-degree assault, and second-degree criminal possession of a weapon. The state trial court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of 18 years to life on the attempted first-degree robbery and weapon-possession charges and 14 years to life on the attempted second-degree robbery and assault charges.

Brims raised several claims, including that the prosecution used race as a reason to strike a prospective juror, that the trial court improperly allowed him to represent himself, that the trial court was biased, that his appellate lawyer was ineffective, and that he was denied a speedy trial and counsel at critical stages. Magistrate Judge Paul E. Davison recommended denying the petition. Brims objected, primarily challenging the treatment of his jury-selection claim and his argument that he had not waived counsel for a later indictment.

Court’s analysis

The court reviewed the challenged portions of the report and recommendation independently and reviewed the remaining portions for clear error or legal error. Because this was a federal challenge to a state conviction, the court applied the demanding standard governing review under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. Relief was available only if the state court’s decision contradicted clearly established federal law, unreasonably applied that law, or rested on an unreasonable determination of the facts.

On the jury-selection claim, the court explained that a defendant challenging a prosecutor’s peremptory strike under the rule established in Batson v. Kentucky must show facts supporting an inference of discrimination. If that showing is made, the prosecutor must give a race-neutral reason, and the court must decide whether the stated reason was a pretext for discrimination. The federal court found that, although the state trial judge may have spoken imprecisely about the need to show a pattern of strikes, the judge required the prosecutor to explain the challenged strikes and found the explanations race-neutral and not pretextual. Brims did not overcome the deference owed to those factual findings, so the court rejected the claim.

On the right-to-counsel claim, the court found that the state trial judge had adequately explained the responsibilities and risks of self-representation, discussed the decision with Brims, and gave him an opportunity to consult appointed counsel. The court therefore concluded that Brims knowingly and voluntarily waived counsel. It also rejected Brims’s argument that the waiver applied only to the first indictment. The court held that the decision to represent oneself applies to the case as a whole rather than separately to each charge or indictment. The court noted that a legal advisor was available to assist Brims during jury selection, trial, and sentencing, but it treated him as proceeding without counsel.

Disposition

Judge Karas adopted the outcome recommended by Judge Davison and denied Brims’s petition. The court dismissed the writ of habeas corpus with prejudice, entered judgment in favor of Respondent J. Collado, declined to issue a certificate of appealability because Brims had not made the required substantial showing of a constitutional violation, certified that an appeal from the judgment on the merits would not be taken in good faith, and directed the Clerk to close the case.