Casmento, Jr. v. Volmar Construction, Inc.

Background

Clifford Casmento, Jr. sued Volmar Construction, Inc., Efstathia Marinakis, and John Volandes over events related to his employment at Volmar. After a five-day trial, the jury found for the defendants on Casmento’s disability-discrimination and whistleblower-retaliation claims concerning his departure from Volmar in 2019.

The jury nevertheless found that Casmento requested a reasonable accommodation for his disability and that Volmar failed to accommodate him under the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law. The jury awarded no compensatory or nominal damages but awarded $300,000 in punitive damages.

Casmento testified that he had heart disease, type 2 diabetes, and impaired vision that made it difficult to read small print. He requested an iPad to use the Safety Reports application, which he said operated only on an iPhone or iPad and was difficult to read on his iPhone. He testified that the iPad would reduce eye strain. The trial evidence also included emails about the request and testimony that Marinakis told him to get an eye exam when the request was denied.

Volmar moved after trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b) for judgment as a matter of law. That motion asks the court to overturn a jury verdict when no reasonable jury could have found for the opposing party based on the evidence. Volmar challenged the accommodation finding and the punitive-damages award.

Reasonable-accommodation claim

The court explained that a failure-to-accommodate claim under the New York State and New York City laws requires proof that the plaintiff had a covered disability, the employer knew about it, the plaintiff could perform the job with a reasonable accommodation, and the employer refused to provide the accommodation.

The court acknowledged that the emails alone did not clearly tell Volmar that the iPad request was based on a disability. The emails mainly described business reasons for using an iPad and the difficulty of viewing Safety Reports on an iPhone. But the court held that, considering the evidence in Casmento’s favor, a reasonable jury could rely on his testimony that he had told people at Volmar about his eyesight problems and on Marinakis’s statement that he should get an eye exam. That evidence could support a finding that Volmar knew about the disability, understood the iPad request as an accommodation request, and refused it without engaging in the required good-faith discussion about possible accommodations.

The court also rejected Volmar’s argument that Casmento’s own testimony could not establish that an iPad was needed. Casmento testified that Safety Reports was used for his work, worked only on an iPhone or iPad, and was difficult for him to read on his iPhone because of his impaired eyesight. The court stated that the connection between poor eyesight and a request for a larger screen was a matter of common sense and that Volmar cited no authority requiring additional evidence in these circumstances.

The court further rejected Volmar’s reliance on Casmento’s eye-examination records, which described his ocular history as unremarkable, recorded 20/20 vision, and stated that he reported no ocular complaints. Casmento gave contrary testimony about his difficulty reading legal and safety documents, including his need to enlarge the font on his phone. The court held that a reasonable jury could credit that testimony.

Volmar also argued that Casmento had not shown that using Safety Reports while traveling was an essential job function. The court concluded that this argument had not been specifically raised in Volmar’s earlier Rule 50(a) motion before the case went to the jury. The court therefore could grant relief on that basis only to prevent a serious injustice, which it found was not present. In addition, the court held that the evidence supported a finding that Safety Reports was part of Casmento’s job responsibilities, that he traveled to work sites, and that an iPad was needed to use the application given his impairment.

Punitive damages

Volmar argued that the evidence did not support punitive damages and that the $300,000 award was excessive. The court explained that reducing an allegedly excessive damages award generally requires a motion under Rule 59, which can involve a new trial or a reduced award accepted by the plaintiff. Volmar stated that it was not seeking a new trial and brought its motion under Rule 50 instead. The court therefore held that it lacked power simply to reduce the award through Rule 50 and rejected that part of Volmar’s argument.

The court also held that Volmar had not preserved its argument that the evidence was insufficient to support punitive damages because Volmar did not raise that specific argument in its earlier Rule 50(a) motion. The court nevertheless addressed the argument and found it unpersuasive. Under the New York City Human Rights Law, punitive damages may be available for willful or wanton negligence, recklessness, or conscious disregard of another person’s rights. The court concluded that the evidence, viewed in Casmento’s favor, could support a finding that Volmar understood the connection between the iPad request and Casmento’s eyesight problems but refused to engage in an interactive process.

The court noted that the New York State Human Rights Law does not provide punitive damages for this type of claim, except in housing-discrimination cases. It therefore assessed whether the punitive-damages award was supported under the New York City law.

Disposition

The court denied Volmar’s Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law and directed the Clerk of Court to close the motion docket entry. The opinion does not state that the motion was denied with or without prejudice.