Monroe v. Cambel

Background

Michael J. Monroe, proceeding without a lawyer and without paying the filing fee, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Town of Haverstraw and Officers Sean Cambel, William Santiago, and Ian Kaye. Monroe alleges that the officers used excessive force while arresting him on November 6, 2020, including slamming him into a bathroom sink, stomping on his foot, and throwing him into a police vehicle so that he hit his head. He also alleges that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs because he could not see a doctor the next day.

The defendants filed a motion in limine, which asks the court to decide before trial whether particular evidence may be introduced. They sought to admit six categories of Monroe’s prior convictions under Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b), 609(a)(1), and 609(a)(2).

Rule 404(b): Evidence Offered to Show Motive or Intent

The defendants sought to use three groups of convictions to show that Monroe intended or had a motive to resist arrest: (1) criminal contempt for disobeying an order of protection; (2) unlawful imprisonment, criminal obstruction of breathing or blood circulation, and harassment; and (3) attempted assault in the second degree involving intent to cause physical injury with a weapon or instrument.

The court denied this request. It explained that prior convictions generally cannot be used simply to show that a person acted consistently with a supposed character trait. Although Rule 404(b) can allow prior-act evidence for purposes such as motive or intent, the defendants did not identify specific information in Monroe’s record showing an intent or motive to resist arrest, such as an outstanding warrant. The court also found that Monroe’s motive for resisting arrest was not relevant to the excessive-force issue. Even if Monroe resisted, the defendants would not be entitled to use excessive force.

Rule 609(a)(1): Impeachment by Certain Convictions

Rule 609(a)(1) concerns using qualifying convictions to challenge a witness’s credibility. The court denied the request to admit Monroe’s attempted-assault conviction because assault is a violent crime and the defendants did not show that this conviction involved dishonesty or false statements relevant to credibility.

The court denied without prejudice the request to admit Monroe’s conviction for criminal possession of stolen property in the fourth degree involving a credit card. The court explained that theft crimes can bear on truthfulness, but the defendants provided too few details about this particular conviction to determine whether it was relevant to Monroe’s credibility. The court left open renewal of the request if the facts established at trial warrant it.

Rule 609(a)(2): Convictions Involving Dishonesty

Rule 609(a)(2) requires admission for impeachment of convictions involving dishonesty or false statements. The defendants sought to admit Monroe’s convictions for possession of a forged instrument in the third degree and attempted forgery in the second degree involving a deed, will, codicil, contract, credit card, or similar instrument.

The court granted this request. It concluded that both possession of a forged instrument and attempted forgery involve dishonesty or false statements and therefore are admissible for impeachment under Rule 609(a)(2).

Disposition

Judge Philip M. Halpern granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion in limine. The court denied the Rule 404(b) request; denied admission of the attempted-assault conviction under Rule 609(a)(1); denied without prejudice admission of the stolen-property conviction under Rule 609(a)(1); and granted admission of the forged-instrument and attempted-forgery convictions under Rule 609(a)(2). The Clerk was directed to terminate the motion pending at docket entry 56. The court also stated that a pretrial ruling on admissibility may change if the actual testimony at trial differs from what was expected.