Curran v. Keyser

Background

Justin Curran filed a petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which allows a person in state custody to seek federal review of alleged constitutional violations. United States Magistrate Judge Paul E. Davison recommended denying the petition. Curran, who was representing himself, objected to that recommendation.

The district court explained that it reviews specific objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation independently. It generally reviews portions without specific objections only for clear error. The court also noted that a party generally cannot use objections to present arguments or evidence that could have been presented to the magistrate judge.

Claims and Analysis

1. Right to testify and psychiatric evidence. Davison concluded that Curran’s Sixth Amendment right to testify was not violated when the state trial court barred him from presenting a psychiatric defense because he had not provided the notice required by New York Criminal Procedure Law § 250.10. Curran’s objection instead argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to give notice and for allegedly preventing him from testifying. The district court said ineffective assistance had not been raised in the petition or presented to the magistrate judge, so it could not be raised for the first time in the objections. The court also found no error in Davison’s analysis.

2. Meaning of “detention facility.” Curran argued that an elevator in the back of the courthouse was not a detention facility under the state escape statute. Davison concluded that the state court’s interpretation of state law did not present a question that could be reviewed in the federal petition. Curran’s objection instead argued that the evidence did not show he intended to escape. The district court found that this was a new argument and, in any event, found no error in Davison’s analysis. The court also stated that the evidence that Curran assaulted an officer in the elevator and then two additional officers supported an inference that he was trying to escape.

3. Jury instruction. Davison found no due process violation in the jury instruction stating that Curran had been charged with second-degree murder, a Class A felony, when the alleged attempted escape occurred. The district court agreed. It said the parties had stipulated to the charge, the seriousness of the charge was relevant to Curran’s possible motive to escape, the instruction did not suggest that Curran was guilty of murder, and the jury was instructed on the presumption of innocence.

4. Questions about medication. Davison rejected Curran’s claim that his constitutional rights were violated when the trial judge prevented him from asking a corrections officer whether Curran had received medication on the relevant day. Davison concluded that the evidence concerned the psychiatric defense that had properly been excluded under the notice requirement. The district court found that Curran’s objection was general and did not specifically challenge the recommendation. It also agreed that ordinary evidentiary and procedural limits on cross-examination did not violate the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation right.

Disposition

Judge Seibel adopted the report and recommendation as the decision of the court and denied the petition. The court stated that reasonable jurists would not find the constitutional claims debatable, so a certificate of appealability would not issue. It also ruled that no evidentiary hearing was required because Curran had not identified a factual dispute requiring one, and it directed the clerk to close the case.