Herrera v. New York City Department of Education

Background

Lois Herrera, Jaye Murray, and Laura Feijoo sued the New York City Department of Education and Richard Carranza, the department’s former chancellor. The plaintiffs are white women who held senior positions at the department. They alleged that defendants used a race-conscious staffing policy that caused them to be demoted or sidelined in favor of people of color whom the plaintiffs considered less qualified.

Herrera was removed as chief executive officer of the Office of Safety and Youth Development and given a newly created senior-administrator position. She said she lost her title, job responsibilities, direct reports, and regular workspace. Murray said she was demoted from executive director to director, lost most of her work streams, and began reporting to another employee who took over much of her former role. Feijoo was removed from her cabinet-level position supervising the department’s superintendents and was given a labor-and-policy advisory role that she said had little real work. She also claimed she was passed over for a more senior position.

The plaintiffs offered evidence that the mayor and Carranza considered racial diversity important in staffing senior department positions. They also cited statements and training materials concerning racial equity, the plaintiffs’ replacement or possible replacement by people of different races, and the absence of open or competitive hiring processes for several positions. Defendants disputed that race motivated the employment decisions and argued that the changes were based on restructuring, performance, or qualifications.

Summary-judgment standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no genuine dispute about a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. At this stage, the court must view the evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion. The court may not decide which witnesses are credible or weigh competing evidence.

Race-discrimination claims under Section 1983

Section 1983 provides a way to sue a person acting under state authority for violating federal constitutional rights. The plaintiffs relied on the Equal Protection Clause, which prohibits government action based on race. Because the Department of Education is a municipal agency, the plaintiffs also had to provide evidence that an official policy or custom caused the alleged constitutional violation. This type of municipal-liability claim is often called a Monell claim.

The court held that the plaintiffs offered enough evidence to create genuine factual disputes about both their individual discrimination claims and the Department of Education’s policy. The court found evidence from which a jury could conclude that the plaintiffs experienced materially adverse employment actions. The evidence included less distinguished or disputed titles, significantly reduced responsibilities, removal from supervisory roles, and being passed over for promotion. The court explained that a salary increase does not by itself prevent an employment change from being materially adverse.

The court also found sufficient evidence to support an inference of race discrimination. The plaintiffs’ evidence included their satisfactory or well-regarded work, replacement by employees of different races, alleged differences in qualifications, the absence of competitive selection processes, and statements concerning race and racial diversity. The court emphasized that it could not resolve credibility disputes at summary judgment.

The court further held that the evidence could support a finding that de Blasio and Carranza were policymakers whose actions or policies were the moving force behind the alleged discrimination. It was not necessary at this stage for the plaintiffs to prove that race was the only reason for the decisions, or that Carranza personally made every staffing decision. The court stated that a jury could decide whether a policy of using race as a determinative factor in staffing led to the plaintiffs’ demotions or sidelining.

The motion for summary judgment was denied as to the plaintiffs’ race-discrimination claims under Section 1983. The court expressly stated that it was not deciding the defendants’ ultimate liability.

Sex-discrimination claims under Section 1983

The court held that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ sex-discrimination claims under Section 1983. Although the plaintiffs argued that they were treated especially poorly as white women, the court found no evidence of purposeful discrimination because of sex. The court noted that women received several of the positions at issue and that the record did not contain discriminatory comments about women or white women as a group.

The motion for summary judgment was granted as to the Section 1983 sex-discrimination claims.

New York City Human Rights Law claims

The plaintiffs also asserted race- and sex-discrimination claims under the New York City Human Rights Law. The court noted that they had not filed the required notice of claim before suing the Department of Education or its officers. The plaintiffs also stated in their brief that they did not pursue those claims.

The motion for summary judgment was granted as to all claims under the New York City Human Rights Law.

Disposition

Judge Mary Kay Vyskocil denied in part and granted in part defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The motion was denied as to the plaintiffs’ Section 1983 race-discrimination claims and granted as to the Section 1983 sex-discrimination claims and all New York City Human Rights Law claims. The clerk was requested to terminate the motion.