Murray v. The Dutchess County Department of Public Works

Background

Nelson A. Murray sued Dutchess County, Robert Balkind, Matthew Dutcavich, James DeWitt, and Marcus Molinaro. His First Amended Complaint alleged race discrimination, retaliation, a racially hostile work environment, and conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and the New York State Human Rights Law.

In an earlier ruling, Judge Karas granted in part and denied in part defendants’ motion to dismiss. That ruling dismissed the disparate-treatment, hostile-work-environment, and conspiracy claims. Murray later voluntarily dismissed his claims against DeWitt and Molinaro and agreed to dismiss with prejudice all claims except Counts 3, 6, 9, and 10 against Dutchess County, Balkind, and Dutcavich. The remaining claims were retaliation under § 1983, Title VII, and the New York State Human Rights Law, plus aiding and abetting under the New York State Human Rights Law.

Murray met with the County’s equal-employment-opportunity officer on April 3, 2017, and complained that he was treated differently from Caucasian coworkers regarding overtime and promotion opportunities. He later filed two complaints with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and a union grievance. During the same period, defendants investigated reports that a County-assigned vehicle was parked in Murray’s driveway when he was expected to be working at a bridge project. Balkind directed Murray to attend meetings on April 27, May 15, and May 19, 2017, to discuss the vehicle. Murray did not attend those meetings. Disciplinary charges were then brought against him for insubordination, and he was terminated effective June 28, 2017.

Summary-judgment standard

Under Rule 56, summary judgment must be granted when there is no genuine dispute about a material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must view ambiguities and reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion, but the opposing party must identify admissible evidence that could support a trial. The court does not weigh the evidence or decide disputed facts at this stage.

Retaliation claims

The court analyzed Murray’s § 1983, Title VII, and New York State Human Rights Law retaliation claims together because they use the same burden-shifting framework. A retaliation plaintiff generally must show protected activity, the employer’s awareness of that activity, a materially adverse employment action, and a causal connection between the activity and the action.

The defendants conceded that Murray engaged in protected activity when he met with the equal-employment-opportunity officer and filed two Equal Employment Opportunity Commission complaints. The court also found that defendants knew about the activity and that Murray’s termination was an adverse employment action. It held that the less-than-three-month period between Murray’s first complaint and his termination was enough to establish a causal connection at the initial stage. Thus, Murray established a prima facie case, meaning enough initial evidence to shift the burden to defendants.

Defendants identified repeated insubordination as their legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for the termination. Specifically, they relied on Murray’s refusal to attend three meetings with Balkind about the County vehicle, after Murray had been warned that the matter could lead to discipline.

The burden then returned to Murray to show that insubordination was a pretext, meaning a false explanation concealing retaliation. Murray argued that no policy prohibited employees from taking a County vehicle home for lunch, that he had answered Balkind’s questions by email, and that employers do not usually fire their best employees for a first offense. The court held that these arguments did not provide evidence that retaliation was the real reason for his termination. It found that Murray relied on self-serving, speculative, and conclusory statements and had not identified admissible evidence creating a triable factual dispute. The court therefore granted defendants summary judgment on the § 1983, Title VII, and New York State Human Rights Law retaliation claims.

Aiding-and-abetting claim

Murray also asserted that Balkind and Dutcavich were liable as aiders and abettors under the New York State Human Rights Law. The court explained that such liability requires an underlying violation of that law by an employer or principal. Because Murray had not established a primary New York State Human Rights Law violation, the court held that there could be no aiding-and-abetting liability and granted defendants summary judgment on that claim.

Disposition

Judge Halpern granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed Murray’s First Amended Complaint with prejudice and directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the pending motion and close the case.