Bramble v. Moodys Corporation
- Nelson Roman
- 7:19-cv-05182
- U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
- 16
In Bramble v. Moody’s, Judge Roman granted Defendants’ summary-judgment motion and dismissed her racial-discrimination claims with prejudice.
Felicia Bramble’s racial-discrimination claims against Moody’s Corporation, Scott Kenney, and Adam Berkowicz were dismissed with prejudice; the defendants received judgment in their favor.
What happened
In Bramble v. Moody’s Corporation, Felicia Bramble sued Moody’s Corporation, Scott Kenney, and Adam Berkowicz, alleging that her termination was based on race. Moody’s fired Bramble after she approved a direct-deposit change requested through a fraudulent outside email and directed a subordinate to bypass the usual verification process.
Bramble argued that Moody’s stated reason was a cover for discrimination because she had worked there for fifteen years, received good reviews, raises, and promotions, and was not given progressive discipline. She also pointed to several other workplace incidents and an alleged London employee who was not disciplined for a similar email-related mistake. The court found that these examples did not provide enough reliable evidence that similarly situated employees outside Bramble’s protected group were treated more favorably or that race influenced the termination.
Judge Nelson S. Roman granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on all claims. He dismissed Bramble’s claims under federal, New York State, and New York City workplace-discrimination laws with prejudice, directed judgment for the defendants, and closed the case.
The detailed version
- Bramble v. Moodys Corporation · No. 7:19-cv-05182
- Nelson Roman
- Mar. 2, 2023
Background
Felicia Bramble sued Moody’s Corporation, Scott Kenney, and Adam Berkowicz, asserting workplace racial-discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the New York State Human Rights Law, and the New York City Human Rights Law. The defendants moved for summary judgment on all claims. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows there is no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.
Bramble worked for Moody’s from October 2003 until her termination in 2018. She was Black, and Berkowicz, who was Hispanic, was her second-level supervisor. Berkowicz had promoted her three times and had given her raises and positive evaluations. Bramble’s direct supervisor, Lisa Agostini, was also Black.
On July 23, 2018, Bramble received an email that appeared to come from Kenney but was sent from an outside email address. The sender asked to change Kenney’s direct-deposit information. Bramble first directed the sender to use the payroll self-service portal, but then agreed to accept the new bank-account details by email. She forwarded the exchange to a subordinate, instructed the subordinate to update Kenney’s information without the normal pre-verification period, and told the subordinate not to require a voided check or bank letter. Kenney later did not receive his paycheck. After learning that the email was not from Kenney, payroll stopped payment to the unverified account.
An investigation concluded that Bramble likely violated Moody’s Code of Conduct. Bramble acknowledged that she had made a mistake and failed to follow payroll procedures requiring documentation verifying that the new account belonged to the employee. Moody’s terminated her for failing to follow those procedures and directing her subordinate to do the same. Bramble argued that this explanation was a pretext, meaning a false reason used to conceal racial discrimination.
Claims and Evidence
For her Title VII and New York State claims, Bramble needed to provide evidence supporting an inference of racial discrimination. She relied primarily on an alleged Moody’s policy of progressive discipline and on a report that an employee in the company’s London office had made a similar phishing-related mistake without being disciplined.
The court found that Bramble’s evidence about the London incident consisted of hearsay—statements from people outside the evidence presented directly to the court—and that she could not identify the employee’s name, position, department, supervisor, or applicable workplace rules. She also could not show that the London employee and Bramble were similar in the important respects required for a comparison. Bramble admitted that she could not identify another U.S. Payroll employee who had made the same combination of mistakes and caused an employee to miss a paycheck.
Bramble also cited several other events: a period when her work phone service was not activated, Berkowicz’s question about whether he had discriminated against her, her office arrangement after a promotion, the lack of public announcements for two of her promotions, and the removal of her access to salary-band information. The court concluded that these events did not support an inference that race influenced her termination. Among other reasons, the employees Bramble compared herself with had different positions, seniority, duties, or departments; Berkowicz’s question occurred more than a year before the termination and outside the termination decision; and the only employee Bramble identified as earning more than she did was also Black and held a more senior position in another department.
Court’s Ruling
The court held that Bramble had not established the required initial showing of discrimination under Title VII and the New York State Human Rights Law. Specifically, she had not produced sufficient evidence that the circumstances of her termination suggested racial discrimination. The court therefore dismissed those claims with prejudice. The court also stated that individuals cannot be held liable under Title VII and dismissed the Title VII claims against Kenney and Berkowicz with prejudice.
For the New York City Human Rights Law claims, which use a broader standard, Bramble still needed evidence creating a genuine factual dispute that discrimination played a role in the defendants’ actions. The court concluded that, for the reasons already discussed, she had not provided sufficient evidence to meet that standard.
Judge Nelson S. Roman granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The court dismissed Bramble’s claims with prejudice, directed the Clerk of Court to enter judgment for the defendants, terminated the motion, and closed the case.
Read the full 16-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.