Rivera v. Greater Hudson Valley Health System

Background

George Rivera sued Greater Hudson Valley Health System, Orange Regional Medical Center, and several individual defendants. He alleged discrimination based on race and national origin under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and race, national-origin, and age discrimination under the New York State Human Rights Law. He also alleged retaliation based on complaints about discrimination and workplace security issues.

Rivera worked as a security employee and later held management positions. In 2019, some administrative scheduling duties were reassigned to Mollie Kennedy, a younger Caucasian employee, although Rivera retained supervisory and decision-making authority over scheduling. Rivera later received performance warnings, a performance improvement plan, and a final written warning. He was terminated on January 30, 2020, after the defendants determined that he had not met the plan’s expectations. The opinion states that he was replaced by Greg Mills, a Caucasian man who was 63 years old.

Summary-judgment standard

The defendants asked for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court must view reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, but a plaintiff cannot rely only on conclusory statements or unsupported speculation.

Title VII race and national-origin claims

The court applied the burden-shifting framework used for employment-discrimination claims. Rivera first had to provide enough evidence that he was qualified, suffered an adverse employment action, and was treated under circumstances suggesting discrimination.

The court concluded that Rivera did not establish that he was qualified for his Manager of Security position for purposes of his initial showing. The record contained performance warnings, a performance-improvement plan, and other documents identifying problems with investigations, communication, attendance, scheduling, and discipline of security officers. Rivera disputed those findings, but the court found that he did not provide sufficient corroborating evidence to rebut the defendants’ documented performance concerns.

The court also ruled that Rivera’s termination was an adverse employment action, but that his placement on a performance-improvement plan was not. The reassignment of administrative scheduling tasks likewise was not an adverse employment action because Rivera retained supervisory and decision-making authority, was not demoted, and did not receive less pay.

The court further found that Rivera did not provide sufficient evidence of an inference of race or national-origin discrimination. His general statements about treatment of younger or white coworkers did not identify a similarly situated employee who was treated more favorably. The court also found no sufficient evidence that a discriminatory comment about Rivera’s race or national origin had been made. It therefore granted summary judgment on the Title VII claim.

Age-discrimination claim

For the age claim, the court held that Rivera also failed to provide sufficient evidence that age was the reason for his termination. Rivera relied on statements attributed to Gregg Hough concerning another older security officer and Hough’s statement that Rivera looked tired. The court treated those statements as isolated remarks that did not sufficiently connect Rivera’s termination to his age. The court also noted that Hough had previously given Rivera positive performance evaluations and that Rivera had been promoted and received a pay increase after his May 2019 complaint.

The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find, on this record, that Rivera’s age was the cause of his termination. It granted summary judgment on the Age Discrimination in Employment Act claim.

New York State Human Rights Law claims

The court applied the same general analysis to Rivera’s New York State Human Rights Law discrimination claims and granted summary judgment on them. It also dismissed the aiding-and-abetting claims against the individual defendants because that theory requires an underlying discrimination violation, which the court found was not established.

The court separately ruled that Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act do not impose personal liability on individual employees or supervisors. It dismissed Rivera’s claims under those statutes against the individual defendants in both their individual and official capacities.

Retaliation claims

Although retaliation was not properly listed as a separate cause of action in the complaint, the court considered the retaliation theories because the complaint and the parties’ factual submissions described them. Rivera identified his May 2019 complaint about age discrimination and his October 31, 2019 complaint about a contractor’s use of an identification badge as protected activity.

The court found that the October complaint was about a security-protocol violation, not discrimination based on age, race, or national origin, so it was not protected activity under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, or the New York law at issue. The court found that Rivera’s May complaint about age discrimination was protected activity for purposes of an age-retaliation claim, but not for race or national-origin retaliation.

Even so, the court found no sufficient causal connection between the May complaint and Rivera’s termination. Rivera was promoted and received a pay increase about one month after making that complaint, and he did not identify other evidence connecting the complaint to his later termination. The court also ruled that the performance-improvement plan was not an adverse employment action. It dismissed the retaliation claims.

Disposition

The court granted the defendants’ summary-judgment motion and dismissed Rivera’s claims with prejudice as to all defendants. It directed the clerk to enter judgment for the defendants and terminate the motion.