Leslie v. City of New York

Background

Shakira Leslie and Shamil Burgos brought this putative class action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of New York and several New York Police Department and medical-examiner officials in their official capacities. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief based on alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment and New York Executive Law Article 49-B.

The complaint alleged that NYPD officers secretly collected DNA from items used by people suspected of crimes, including partially consumed cigarettes, chewing gum, and beverage containers. The NYPD allegedly analyzed the samples, created DNA profiles, placed them in a local Suspect Index, and continuously compared those profiles with DNA from crime-scene evidence. The complaint alleged that profiles could remain in the index for years, including after charges were dismissed.

Leslie and Burgos alleged that officers collected their DNA without their knowledge after their arrests, that they were never indicted, and that the charges against them were dismissed. Their profiles nevertheless remained in the Suspect Index when they filed suit. In February 2020, the NYPD announced reforms providing for audits and possible removal of profiles, but the complaint alleged that removal remained discretionary.

After the lawsuit was filed, the NYPD conducted an expedited review and removed both plaintiffs’ profiles on May 19, 2022. Burgos’s attorney had previously requested removal, but that request had been denied without explanation. The defendants then moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), arguing that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that the case had become moot after the profiles were removed. They alternatively argued that the court should decline supplemental jurisdiction over the Article 49-B claim.

Standing

The court held that both plaintiffs plausibly established Article III standing. Standing requires an injury in fact, a connection between that injury and the defendants’ conduct, and a likelihood that a favorable decision would provide relief.

The court found an injury in fact because the defendants allegedly collected and analyzed the plaintiffs’ DNA without their knowledge, consent, a warrant, or a court order; maintained the DNA in a government database; and compared it with crime-scene evidence for years. The court also found the required causal connection because the alleged injury resulted from the defendants’ establishment and operation of the Suspect Index.

The court rejected the argument that the plaintiffs’ injuries were too speculative or insubstantial. It explained that standing is evaluated when a complaint is filed, and the plaintiffs’ DNA was still in the Suspect Index and allegedly being compared with crime-scene evidence at that time. The court also found that the requested relief could address the alleged injury, satisfying the redressability requirement.

Mootness

The court held that the NYPD’s post-filing removal of the plaintiffs’ DNA did not make the case moot. It applied two exceptions to the mootness doctrine.

First, the court applied the inherently transitory exception. This exception can preserve a putative class action when an individual claim may end before the court can decide class certification and a continuing class of people remains subject to the challenged conduct. The court found a significant possibility that the NYPD could remove future plaintiffs’ profiles before class certification because its removal process was discretionary and it had expedited removal of Leslie’s and Burgos’s profiles after they sued. The court also found that there would be a continuing group of people whose DNA was placed in the Suspect Index and compared with crime-scene DNA.

Second, the court applied the voluntary-cessation exception. A defendant’s voluntary end to challenged conduct generally does not make a case moot unless the defendant shows that the conduct will not reasonably recur and that the alleged violation’s effects have been completely and permanently eliminated. The court found that the challenged Suspect Index practices continued for the putative class, that there was no indication the defendants planned to discontinue the system, and that the timing of the expedited removal weighed against mootness. The court therefore concluded that the defendants had not met their heavy burden.

Pullman Abstention

The court also considered whether to abstain under the Pullman doctrine. Pullman abstention allows a federal court to pause a case when an unclear state-law question could eliminate or change the need to decide a federal constitutional question.

The court concluded that abstention was not warranted. It determined that Article 49-B was not unclear merely because it did not expressly authorize local DNA indexes or because state trial courts had disagreed about the statute’s implications. The court also held that the Fourth Amendment claims did not depend on resolving the state-law claim first. It identified three separate Fourth Amendment issues: the taking of DNA without knowledge or consent, the indexing and maintenance of DNA in the Suspect Index, and the comparison of DNA with crime-scene evidence. Finally, the court found that no interpretation of Article 49-B would eliminate the need to address whether the taking and analysis of DNA violated the Fourth Amendment.

Supplemental Jurisdiction and Disposition

The court reserved its decision on whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the Article 49-B claim. It reasoned that the Fourth Amendment claims were analytically independent of the state-law claim, but that resolving the federal claims could affect the scope of the state-law claim.

The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. This ruling addressed standing, mootness, abstention, and the timing of the supplemental-jurisdiction issue; it did not decide the ultimate merits of whether the defendants’ DNA practices violated the Fourth Amendment or Article 49-B. Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald directed the Clerk of Court to terminate the motion.