Freckleton v. Mercy College NY

Background

Malvia Freckleton sued Mercy College NY, Susan Moscou, and Miriam Ford. She alleged race and disability discrimination and retaliation, fraud, and breach of contract. She proceeded without a lawyer. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which tests whether a complaint states a legally sufficient claim.

Freckleton alleged that she had attended the College of New Rochelle, received poor grades from Professor Susan Wilson, and later received acceptance and welcome letters from Mercy. She alleged that Mercy then withdrew or denied her admission to its nursing program in July and August 2019. She also alleged that she had anxiety, had previously received extra examination time, and sent Mercy a doctor’s letter seeking disability-related accommodations. Mercy responded that the letter did not satisfy its documentation requirements and requested more information. Freckleton also alleged that Mercy later told her to stop communicating with its nursing department and not attend Mercy events.

Claims Under Section 1983

Freckleton identified Section 1983 as a basis for jurisdiction and alleged claims against state or local officials. The court explained that Section 1983 requires conduct by a person acting under state law. It held that Freckleton had not alleged that the defendants were state or local officials acting under state law, so her claims could not be brought under Section 1983.

Race Discrimination and Race Retaliation

The court treated Freckleton’s race claims as claims under Title VI and Section 1981. It dismissed the race-discrimination claim because Freckleton did not allege direct discriminatory comments, identify similarly situated students who were treated better, or provide other facts supporting a plausible inference that Mercy acted because of her race. The court also noted that she did not allege that Mercy received federal financial assistance or that she was a beneficiary of the relevant federally funded program, which independently defeated her Title VI claim.

The court dismissed the race-retaliation claim. Freckleton relied on an internal grievance concerning Wilson in 2018 and identified Mercy’s later rejection and emails as retaliatory actions. The court assumed, without deciding, that the grievance was protected activity, but concluded that at least six months had passed before Mercy’s actions. Freckleton also did not allege direct retaliatory motive or other facts establishing a causal connection.

Disability Claims

Although Freckleton identified Title VI as the basis for her disability claim, the court explained that Title VI addresses race, color, and national-origin discrimination, not disability discrimination. The court therefore construed the claim under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), which covers disability discrimination by private educational institutions.

The court dismissed the failure-to-accommodate claim. Freckleton alleged that Mercy asked for more information about her disability, but she did not allege that Mercy actually denied a requested accommodation or delayed responding long enough to amount to a constructive denial.

The court also dismissed the ADA disability-discrimination claim. Freckleton did not allege that Mercy made derogatory comments about her disability, referred to her disability in connection with an adverse action, or treated similarly situated people without disabilities more favorably. The court therefore found no factual basis for concluding that Mercy excluded or otherwise treated her adversely because of her disability.

The court allowed the ADA-retaliation claim against Mercy to proceed. Requesting a reasonable accommodation is protected activity under the ADA. Freckleton alleged that Mercy knew about her request, told her by July 23, 2019, that she was no longer a student, and emailed her on August 8 that it could not admit her to the nursing program. The court concluded that the 12-day-to-three-week period between the accommodation request and these actions was close enough in time to support a plausible causal connection at the pleading stage. The court denied the motion as to this claim against Mercy.

Breach of Contract

The court dismissed the breach-of-contract claim. Under New York law, a plaintiff must identify an agreement, the plaintiff’s performance, the defendant’s breach, and damages. Freckleton alleged that Mercy signed or made a contract concerning her nursing education, acceptance, placement, application, and financial aid, but she did not identify the specific contract terms or explain which provision Mercy breached.

Fraud

The court dismissed the fraud claim. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b) requires fraud to be pleaded with particularity, including the allegedly false statements, who made them, when and where they were made, and why they were fraudulent. The court found that Freckleton did not provide those details, did not explain why the statements were false when made, did not allege reliance on the statement that Moscou and Ford did not know Wilson, and did not allege facts supporting a strong inference that the defendants intended to commit fraud.

Disposition

The conclusion states that the defendants’ motion was denied in part and granted in part. The court granted the motion as to Freckleton’s race discrimination and retaliation, failure-to-reasonably-accommodate, disability discrimination, breach-of-contract, and fraud claims. It denied the motion as to her ADA-retaliation claim against Mercy. The dismissed claims were dismissed without prejudice because this was the first adjudication of those claims on the merits. Freckleton was given 30 days to file an amended complaint containing all claims, defendants, and factual allegations she wanted the court to consider. The court stated that failure to timely amend could lead to dismissal with prejudice. The clerk was directed to terminate the pending motion, and the court scheduled a status conference for May 4, 2023.