Noel v. City Of New York

Background

Shauna Noel and Emmanuella Senat sued the City of New York under the Fair Housing Act and the New York City Human Rights Law. They challenged the City’s community preference policy for distributing affordable housing, asserting that it has a racially disparate impact, perpetuates residential segregation, and reflects intentional racial discrimination. The opinion notes that, in an earlier summary-judgment ruling, the court granted the City summary judgment on the disparate-impact claim but denied both sides’ summary-judgment motions on the segregation and intentional-discrimination claims.

The plaintiffs offered Professor Myron Orfield as an expert. His report discussed residential segregation in American cities, the harms associated with segregation, resistance to integration, and social and political dynamics surrounding affordable housing and racial change. He also offered opinions about City officials’ awareness of resistance to racial change and about alternatives that he believed could accomplish the community preference policy’s goals with less discrimination.

Motion and Legal Standard

The City moved to exclude Professor Orfield’s report and past and future testimony. It argued that his opinions were unreliable, irrelevant, and improper because they took over the roles of the court, lawyers, and factfinder. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, the court must determine whether expert testimony is relevant, based on sufficient facts or data, produced through reliable methods, and reliably applied to the case. Expert testimony also may not tell the jury what legal result to reach or decide issues of intent that belong to the factfinder.

Court’s Analysis

The court found Professor Orfield’s general opinions about the prevalence of segregation, the harms of segregation, and the political and social dynamics surrounding integration sufficiently reliable. Although the City argued that his experience was focused primarily outside New York City and that he had not conducted research specifically about New York City’s housing conditions, policies, or demographics, the court held that those concerns generally affected the weight and credibility of his testimony rather than its admissibility. The City could address those concerns through cross-examination. The court also rejected the City’s hearsay objection, explaining that experts may rely on out-of-court statements when experts in the field reasonably do so.

The court excluded Professor Orfield’s opinions about alternatives to the community preference policy, which appeared in Section VI of his report. It found that he did not explain why the proposed alternatives would be effective or feasible in New York City, or establish a rational connection between his experience and the particular alternatives he proposed. The court characterized these opinions as speculation and as a one-sided narrative that improperly took over the roles of plaintiffs’ counsel and the jury. The court also excluded his opinions in Section V about the mental states, motivations, and intentions of City officials. Those opinions sought to tell the factfinder what City officials knew or intended and were not sufficiently connected to Professor Orfield’s expertise. The court additionally stated that the opinions in Sections V and VI included inadmissible legal conclusions.

The court declined at that stage to exclude Professor Orfield’s discussions of school segregation and racial residential preferences. It concluded that those topics might help the jury evaluate whether the City’s stated reasons for the policy were legitimate or were a pretext for intentional discrimination. The court also declined to strike portions of Professor Orfield’s declaration based on the City’s argument that they contained material not included in his earlier disclosures or deposition testimony, because the objection was raised in reply and the declaration had not been material to the earlier summary-judgment decision. The court cautioned that undisclosed expert opinions offered later could be excluded under the disclosure rules.

Disposition

Chief Judge Laura Taylor Swain granted the City’s motion to exclude Professor Orfield’s report and testimony in part and denied it in part. The court excluded Sections V and VI and related testimony concerning City officials’ mental states, motivations, and intentions and possible alternatives to the community preference policy. The motion was otherwise denied. The memorandum order resolved docket entry number 893.