Campbell v. City of Yonkers

Background

These consolidated actions arose from the attempted arrest and fatal shooting of Erick Campbell during a surveillance operation involving FBI agents and local police officers. Plaintiffs were members of Campbell’s family and administrators of estates identified in the opinion. They asserted constitutional claims under Section 1983 against local defendants, constitutional damages claims under the Supreme Court’s implied-remedy doctrine for certain federal-officer misconduct against FBI defendants, and Federal Tort Claims Act claims against the United States. They also asserted related state-law claims and claims against the City of Yonkers.

The officers were surveilling a vehicle believed to have been used in an armed bank robbery. When Campbell entered the vehicle, officers surrounded it and ordered him to stop and show his hands. Campbell attempted to drive away, and officers used their vehicles to pin the vehicle in place. The parties disputed whether Campbell picked up and pointed a replica handgun at officers. Timothy Cooper fired sixteen rounds, Thomas Braig fired three, and FBI Agent Brendan Kenney fired two. Ten rounds struck Campbell, who died at a hospital less than an hour later. The opinion states that the shooting lasted only a few seconds and that no officer warned before firing.

Claims and legal standards

Plaintiffs claimed that officers used excessive force by firing at Campbell, boxing in his vehicle, planning the operation, and failing to intervene. They also claimed officers failed to provide constitutionally adequate medical care. The claims against the City of Yonkers alleged inadequate training under Monell, which permits municipal liability when an official policy or custom causes a constitutional violation. The claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act included assault and battery, wrongful death, conscious pain and suffering, and loss of love, support, and familial relationships.

At summary judgment, the court determines whether evidence presents a genuine dispute of material fact requiring a trial. The court does not decide disputed facts or witness credibility at that stage. For deadly-force claims, the relevant question was whether the officers reasonably believed Campbell posed a significant threat of death or serious physical injury.

Rulings on federal defendants and the United States

The court reconsidered its earlier decision allowing constitutional damages claims against the FBI defendants to proceed. Applying the Supreme Court’s later decision in Egbert v. Boule, the court held that plaintiffs’ excessive-force and medical-care claims presented new contexts for an implied federal damages remedy. The court also found reasons to defer to Congress and identified alternative remedies, including Federal Tort Claims Act claims against the United States and an FBI internal investigation. It therefore dismissed the Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims against the FBI defendants.

The court denied summary judgment for the United States on the Federal Tort Claims Act assault-and-battery claim to the extent it was based on FBI Agent Brendan Kenney’s use of deadly force. The court found genuine disputes about what Kenney saw and whether he reasonably believed he needed to protect Detective Terence Malone. The related wrongful-death and conscious-pain-and-suffering claims against the United States could also proceed to that extent.

The court granted summary judgment for the United States on claims based on the shooting by Yonkers officers Braig and Cooper. It held that those officers were not federal employees for Federal Tort Claims Act purposes because the FBI did not manage the details of their work or supervise their daily duties. The court also granted summary judgment for the United States on claims based on the conduct of FBI Agents Andrew Fisher and Daniel Conlon and Supervising Special Agent Daniel McKenna, except that the conclusion allowing the claim based on Kenney’s deadly force applied to Kenney, not McKenna. The opinion’s conclusion states that the federal defendants’ motion was denied only as to claims against the United States based on Kenney’s use of deadly force and was otherwise granted.

Rulings on local police defendants

The court denied summary judgment to Braig and Cooper on the Section 1983 excessive-force claims based on their shooting. The court found competing evidence about whether Campbell brandished or pointed the replica gun, whether officers were in the locations described by the shooters, and whether Campbell remained a threat when the final shots were fired. Those disputes were for a jury. The court also rejected Braig’s and Cooper’s qualified-immunity defense at summary judgment because the same factual disputes prevented deciding as a matter of law whether their conduct was reasonable.

The court dismissed the other excessive-force theories. It held that the vehicle box-in maneuver was objectively reasonable on the undisputed facts because Campbell attempted to flee after officers announced themselves and officers believed he might be armed and connected to armed robberies. It also dismissed the planner-liability claims against Marello and Menton because the plan did not provide for an unconstitutionally excessive use of force. The court dismissed failure-to-intervene claims against Barosa, Malone, Marello, Menton, McGee, Walencik, and Wissner because the shooting occurred within seconds, without warning, and those officers had no realistic opportunity to stop it.

The court dismissed the local defendants’ deliberate-indifference claims concerning medical care. It found that Menton called for an ambulance within a minute, requested that the ambulance be expedited, and that Barosa and McGee performed CPR. The court concluded that the officers did not deprive Campbell of constitutionally adequate medical treatment.

The court granted summary judgment to the Tarrytown defendants and to Malone. It also granted summary judgment to the other local defendants on the claims that did not survive the court’s analysis. Because a reasonable jury could find that Braig and Cooper committed excessive force, the court allowed related assault-and-battery claims against them to proceed. The court dismissed those claims against the other local defendants.

Claims against the City of Yonkers

The court dismissed the City’s Section 1983 training claim. Plaintiffs did not provide evidence identifying a specific training deficiency, showing how different training would have prevented the shooting, or establishing a sufficiently pervasive pattern of deadly force that would have put the City on notice of a training problem.

The court nevertheless allowed plaintiffs’ respondeat superior claim against the City to proceed for assault and battery, wrongful death, and conscious pain and suffering based on Braig’s and Cooper’s conduct. Under New York law, a municipality may be held vicariously liable for torts committed by municipal employees within the scope of employment. The court dismissed the corresponding claims based on Marello, Menton, Walencik, and Wissner because the court found no underlying liability by those officers.

Disposition

The court’s conclusion states that the Tarrytown defendants’ motion and Malone’s motion were GRANTED. The federal defendants’ motion was DENIED as to the United States’ assault-and-battery, wrongful-death, and conscious-pain-and-suffering claims, solely to the extent based on Kenney’s use of deadly force, and was otherwise GRANTED. The Yonkers defendants’ motion was DENIED as to the City’s respondeat-superior claims and Braig’s and Cooper’s claims involving deadly force and related tort and derivative claims, and was otherwise GRANTED. The Clerk was directed to terminate several defendants, and the remaining parties were ordered to attend a case-management conference.