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S.D.N.Y.Substantive rulingFiled Aug. 30, 2023

Lewis v. Westchester County

Judge
Judith McCarthy
Docket
7:20-cv-09017
Court
U.S. District Court · Southern District of New York
Pages
17
Civil RightsSection 1983Summary JudgmentQualified Immunity
In one sentence

In Lewis v. Westchester County, Judge McCarthy denied Officer Richard Lepore’s summary-judgment motion because factual disputes required a jury to consider malicious prosecution.

Who this affects

The ruling affected Theodore Lewis’s surviving federal malicious-prosecution claim against Police Officer Richard Lepore, Jr. It allowed that claim to continue past Lepore’s summary-judgment motion and rejected qualified immunity at this stage.

What happened

In Theodore Lewis v. Westchester County, Theodore Lewis sued under a federal civil-rights law after being arrested and charged with possessing a forgery device, among other offenses. The other charges were dismissed, and the only remaining claim was that Police Officer Richard Lepore maliciously prosecuted him for possessing the forgery device.

Lepore argued that the evidence showed he had probable cause and that Lewis could not prove malice. Lewis argued that factual disputes existed, including whether Lepore investigated information suggesting that the bags containing the embosser belonged to another person. The court also considered whether Lepore was protected by qualified immunity and whether Lewis was entitled to an inference based on missing police recordings.

The court denied Lepore’s motion for summary judgment, finding that a jury could decide whether probable cause continued to exist and whether Lepore acted with malice; it also denied judgment based on qualified immunity and denied Lewis’s request for an adverse inference. Judge McCarthy issued the opinion.

The detailed version

For law students, journalists, and other readers who want the full reasoning

Case
Lewis v. Westchester County · No. 7:20-cv-09017
Judge
Judith McCarthy
Date
Aug. 30, 2023

Background

Theodore Lewis brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal law allowing claims for certain constitutional violations by government officials. The case originally involved Westchester County, Commissioner of Public Safety Thomas Gleason, Police Officer Richard Lepore, Jr., and unidentified officers. Earlier orders dismissed or limited the claims. The only surviving claim addressed in this opinion was Lewis’s claim that Lepore maliciously prosecuted him for criminal possession of a forgery device.

On August 19, 2017, Lewis was traveling in the rear compartment of a U-Haul truck. Lepore stopped the truck after observing it on a parkway where U-Haul trucks were not permitted. Lepore smelled burnt marijuana and found three people, including Lewis, lying on bags in the truck’s cargo area. The bags were not locked and had no tags or other obvious ownership markings. Officers found a .22 caliber handgun, an embosser, and a substance consistent with marijuana. Lewis was arrested and charged with criminal possession of forgery devices, criminal possession of a weapon in the second and fourth degrees, and unlawful possession of marijuana. The charges were later dismissed.

Summary-judgment standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the evidence shows that no genuine dispute about an important fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law. At this stage, the court does not decide which evidence is truthful. It views the evidence and reasonable inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion and determines whether a trial is needed.

Malicious-prosecution claim

A claim for malicious prosecution under § 1983 requires proof that a criminal proceeding was initiated or continued against the plaintiff, ended in the plaintiff’s favor, lacked probable cause, and was motivated by actual malice. The court stated that probable cause for malicious prosecution must exist for each charged offense. Probable cause can later disappear if officers learn new information or fail to investigate information that reasonably calls the prosecution into question.

The court found that the first two elements were undisputed: criminal proceedings had been brought against Lewis and ended in his favor. The dispute concerned whether Lepore had probable cause to initiate and continue the prosecution for possessing the forgery device under a theory that Lewis constructively possessed it. Constructive possession means exercising control over property, or over the area where it is found, even without physically holding it. Mere presence near contraband is not enough.

The record stated that, before the search, Lepore was told that the bags in the rear of the truck belonged to the driver’s cousin, who was sitting in the front cabin. The opinion noted that nothing suggested Lewis was that cousin. The record also did not show what investigation Lepore conducted before signing the criminal complaint the day after the stop. A reasonable jury could find that Lepore should have investigated this potentially exculpatory information and that further investigation might have undermined probable cause for the forgery-device charge.

The court also found a factual tension between Lepore’s deposition testimony that the driver said the bags belonged to her cousin and Lepore’s later affidavit stating that the driver did not know what was in the rear of the truck. The court treated this as a credibility issue that could not be resolved on summary judgment. Because the record did not adequately show what occurred between Lewis’s arrest and arraignment, the court held that a jury must resolve the factual disputes about probable cause. The court likewise could not decide actual malice at this stage because malice may be inferred if probable cause was absent.

Qualified immunity

Qualified immunity can protect a government official from damages liability unless the official violated a constitutional right that was clearly established. Lepore argued that he was entitled to this protection based on the existence of probable cause or, at least, arguable probable cause.

The court denied summary judgment on this defense. The same factual disputes—including what Lepore did with the information that the bags belonged to the driver’s cousin—prevented the court from deciding whether a reasonable police officer with the same information could have believed that probable cause existed to continue Lewis’s prosecution.

Request for an adverse inference

Lewis asked the court to draw a negative inference from Lepore’s failure to produce radio transmissions and police-car camera footage. The court denied that request. It held that Lewis had not shown the required obligation to produce the evidence, culpable state of mind, and relevance of the missing evidence. The court also noted that Lewis had not pursued the discovery procedures available to seek the materials or sanctions.

Disposition

The court denied Lepore’s motion for summary judgment. It also denied Lewis’s request for an adverse inference. The opinion did not resolve the malicious-prosecution claim on the merits; it determined that factual disputes prevented judgment for Lepore at this stage.

The authoritative version

Read the full 17-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.

Open opinion PDF →
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