Lurch, Jr. v. Chaput, MD

Background

Robert Derek Lurch, Jr., proceeding without a lawyer, brought a civil-rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights arising from his involuntary hospitalization, administration of antipsychotic medication, and use of restraints at Bellevue Hospital on December 26, 2013. On March 25, 2022, the court granted summary judgment to France Chaput, M.D., and Maria Marquez, R-N. The Second Circuit later affirmed that order, but its decision did not address Lurch’s separate request to vacate the order based on newly available evidence.

Motion and Legal Standard

Lurch moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2), which permits a court to provide relief from a final judgment based on newly discovered evidence. He identified an August 23, 2019 report by Lama Bazzi, M.D. Bazzi opined that the use of wrist and ankle restraints and intramuscular medication was not warranted because, in her view, Lurch’s behavior did not indicate a medical emergency or an imminent danger to himself or others.

To obtain relief under Rule 60(b)(2), Lurch had to show that the evidence existed when the earlier dispositive proceeding occurred, that he was justifiably unaware of it despite reasonable efforts, that it was admissible and important enough probably to change the outcome, and that it was not merely repetitive or intended only to undermine other evidence. The court assumed, without deciding, that Bazzi’s preliminary report would be admissible.

Court’s Analysis

The court did not decide whether Lurch was justifiably unaware of the report’s contents. Even assuming that requirement was satisfied, the court held that the report did not meet the requirement that the new evidence probably would have changed the summary-judgment outcome.

First, the report did not address whether Lurch’s involuntary hospitalization was warranted, so it could not support disturbing summary judgment on the claims concerning involuntary commitment. Second, although Bazzi disagreed with Chaput’s decision to use medication and restraints, the court found that her report did not adequately address the other evidence supporting Chaput’s decisions. That evidence included reports of Lurch’s agitation and risk of violence, unsuccessful attempts at verbal redirection, and Chaput’s observations and concerns about Lurch’s behavior and refusal of oral medication.

The court explained that, under the legal standard governing the medical-treatment claims, a doctor’s decision must be substantially below accepted professional judgment or standards to support liability under Section 1983. Bazzi’s report assumed that Lurch was not dangerous, but it did not state that it was substantially below accepted professional judgment for the defendants to conclude that he was dangerous. It also did not identify the professional standards allegedly violated or explain that the deviation was substantial.

Disposition

The court denied Lurch’s motion to vacate the earlier summary-judgment order. Judge Analisa Torres directed the clerk to terminate the motion at ECF No. 289 and mail a copy of the order to Lurch.