Carmody v. New York University

Background

Dr. Kristin A. Carmody brought employment-related claims against New York University, NYU Grossman School of Medicine, NYU Langone Hospitals, and several employees. She alleged that the defendants terminated her because of her gender and because she complained about gender discrimination, including unequal pay. She also alleged sex-based pay discrimination, defamation, and breach of an employment contract.

The termination followed a November 30, 2020, emergency-room visit involving the spouse of an NYU employee. A resident examined the patient under Carmody’s supervision. Carmody signed an electronic medical-record attestation and manually added information concerning the patient’s symptoms and examination. After the patient and her husband complained about the care, NYU personnel investigated. On December 4, Dr. Andrew M. Brotman told Dr. Robert Femia that NYU School of Medicine Dean and NYU Langone CEO Dr. Robert I. Grossman wanted Carmody fired. On December 6, Femia gave Carmody the option to resign, citing what she had written in the chart, and she submitted a resignation letter.

Afterward, NYU personnel made statements about Carmody’s treatment of the patient and documentation. The court described statements that Carmody had almost killed a patient, committed fraud, or missed diagnoses. A quality-review committee later concluded that the standard of care had not been met regarding the patient.

Summary-judgment standard

The court evaluated the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Summary judgment is proper when the evidence shows no genuine dispute over a fact that could affect the outcome and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. At this stage, the court viewed the evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to Carmody, the nonmoving party.

Gender-discrimination claims

The court denied summary judgment on Carmody’s Title VII gender-discrimination claim against the NYU Defendants. It found that she had presented enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find an initial showing of discrimination and to question whether the defendants’ stated reason for the termination—falsifying a patient record—was a pretext, meaning a cover for discrimination. The evidence included testimony and records suggesting that attending physicians commonly attested to residents’ notes without physically reexamining patients, evidence that a male physician was treated more leniently for chart-related conduct, evidence that Carmody was replaced initially by a man, and evidence concerning gender-related comments and treatment.

The court also denied summary judgment on Carmody’s New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law gender-discrimination claims against the NYU Defendants, Femia, and Grossman. Those claims remained because the court found evidence that Femia and Grossman may have participated in discriminatory conduct. Summary judgment was granted on those claims as to Drs. Steven B. Abramson, Andrew M. Brotman, and Fritz Francois because the evidence did not sufficiently connect them to Carmody’s termination or to impermissible discrimination.

Retaliation claims

The court denied summary judgment on Carmody’s Title VII retaliation claim against the NYU Defendants. It found evidence that she complained to Femia about pay discrimination and about alleged misogyny and racism before her employment ended. The timing of the complaints and termination, evidence that other physicians engaged in similar documentation practices, and other evidence concerning the defendants’ motives could allow a jury to find that retaliation was a but-for cause of her termination.

The court likewise denied summary judgment on Carmody’s New York State Human Rights Law, New York City Human Rights Law, New York Labor Law, and Equal Pay Act retaliation claims against the NYU Defendants to the extent they were based on retaliatory firing. Summary judgment was denied on the state and city retaliation claims against Femia, but granted to the other individual defendants. The court found insufficient evidence that Abramson, Brotman, or Francois were responsible for the termination, and insufficient evidence that Grossman personally knew about Carmody’s protected complaints.

For the retaliation claim alleging that Carmody’s pay was reduced in response to her complaints, summary judgment was granted to the defendants. The court found that she had not provided evidence that her pay-related complaints caused her to be paid less. Summary judgment was denied on that claim to the extent it alleged retaliation through termination.

Pay-disparity claims

The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all pay-discrimination claims under the Equal Pay Act, New York Labor Law, New York City Human Rights Law, and New York State Human Rights Law. Carmody compared herself with other Vice Chairs, but the record showed that the Vice Chairs had different responsibilities. The court found that Carmody had not provided evidence that she and the male comparators performed substantially equivalent work requiring equal skill, effort, and responsibility.

Defamation claim

The court granted summary judgment to all defendants on the defamation claim. Applying New York law, the court held that the challenged statements were covered by a qualified privilege because they were made by NYU physicians and employees to other NYU staff about patient care and documentation, matters in which the speakers and recipients shared an interest.

Carmody did not provide evidence of the actual malice or common-law malice required to overcome that privilege. The court therefore granted summary judgment to the defendants on Claim 13.

Breach-of-contract claim

The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the breach-of-contract claim. Carmody abandoned two theories—that she was not an at-will employee and that she was not given six months’ notice—so those theories were no longer part of the case. Her remaining theory relied on university policies concerning discrimination and harassment. The court found that the NYU Code of Ethical Conduct expressly stated that it did not form a contract, which defeated the remaining theory.

Disposition

Judge Lorna G. Schofield granted in part and denied in part the defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The surviving claims were the Title VII gender-discrimination and retaliation claims against the NYU Defendants; the New York State Human Rights Law and New York City Human Rights Law gender-discrimination claims against the NYU Defendants, Femia, and Grossman; and the state, city, New York Labor Law, and Equal Pay Act retaliation claims based on retaliatory firing against the NYU Defendants and Femia. The court granted summary judgment on the other claims and defendants identified in the conclusion.