Jones v. County of Westchester

Background

Latonia Jones sued the County of Westchester and Rosa Hazoury and Elke Knudsen, identified as Senior Case Managers at the County’s Department of Social Services. Jones brought the action individually and on behalf of her child, D.J. The claims arose from D.J.’s removal from Jones’s custody and the education D.J. received while in the County’s care and custody.

After earlier rulings dismissed other claims, three claims remained: a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Hazoury and Knudsen; a Title II Americans with Disabilities Act claim against the County; and a state-law negligence claim against the Defendants. The Defendants moved for summary judgment, which asks whether the record shows no genuine dispute over facts important to the case and whether the moving party is entitled to judgment under the law.

Substantive Due Process Claim

The court held that Jones could not pursue a substantive due process claim based on an alleged denial of education. Substantive due process protects certain fundamental rights and prohibits government conduct that is extremely wrongful, but the court concluded that public education is not a fundamental right protected by substantive due process. The court therefore granted summary judgment on this claim and said it did not need to decide whether the Defendants were protected by qualified immunity.

The court stated that it was admonishing the Defendants to the extent the Department of Social Services failed to ensure that D.J. received an adequate education. But it held that such alleged conduct could not support this particular constitutional claim because there is no substantive due process right to public education.

Americans with Disabilities Act Claim

The court also granted summary judgment to the County on Jones’s Title II ADA claim. The court treated Jones’s opposition as relying primarily on a reasonable-accommodation theory. It explained that the relevant question was whether D.J. was denied access to an education-related service because of her disability, not whether the education she received was suitable or adequate. The court stated that a challenge to the substance or quality of services, without illegal disability discrimination, is not actionable under Title II of the ADA.

The court concluded that Jones had not shown that the County denied D.J. a service for which the County was responsible. During D.J.’s time in hospitals and other non-foster placements, the court found that those facilities—not the Department of Social Services—were responsible under the cited state laws and regulations for ensuring that D.J. was enrolled and received an appropriate education. During foster placements, the County had responsibilities involving school-district designation and coordination, but the school districts were responsible for providing educational services.

The court also rejected Jones’s argument concerning D.J.’s 2009 foster placement because the record showed that D.J. was enrolled with the New York City Department of Education while that agency evaluated her individualized education program and considered school placement. The court further held that alleged failures to provide adequate educational services during foster care could not establish ADA liability against the County because those services were the school district’s responsibility and because service-quality challenges are not actionable under the ADA.

Negligence Claim and Disposition

Because the court granted summary judgment on the federal claims, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction—the federal court’s authority to hear related state-law claims—over the negligence claim. It did not assess the merits of that claim and dismissed it without prejudice.

The court’s conclusion states that the Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted. It dismissed the Third Amended Complaint with prejudice except for the state-law claim, which Jones was free to assert in state court to the extent a legally cognizable claim exists. The Clerk was directed to terminate the motion and case, terminate all Defendants, and enter judgment for the Defendants.