Medina v. New York State Division of Parole

Background

Anthony Medina, proceeding without a lawyer, alleged that he is legally blind and physically disabled. His conditions included keratoconus, photophobia, amblyopia, and nerve damage in his arms and hands. He alleged that shelters, correctional officials, and parole officials failed to provide needed accommodations, including transportation assistance and services allowing him to see, read, write, and communicate effectively.

Medina also alleged that officials delayed his transfer from New York to Illinois, that he was arrested after an altercation with another shelter resident, and that his parole was revoked. He challenged the accommodations and procedures used during his parole-revocation proceedings. The court considered the factual allegations as true for purposes of deciding the motions to dismiss, but stated that it was not making findings about whether those allegations were true.

The court considered two unopposed motions to dismiss filed by the City Defendants and State Defendants. Medina had received extensions to respond but ultimately filed no opposition.

Claims and ruling

Medina asserted ten claims: violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act; several equal-protection claims; retaliation; conspiracy; denial of due process during parole revocation; and deliberate indifference under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

Parole-revocation claims. The court dismissed Medina’s fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth claims. These claims challenged the circumstances of his parole revocation, including communication problems, an allegedly inadequate investigation, retaliation, conspiracy, and the fairness and procedures of the revocation hearing. The court applied the rule from Heck v. Humphrey, which generally bars a damages claim under § 1983 when success would necessarily call into question an existing conviction or sentence unless that conviction or sentence has been invalidated. The court concluded that success on these claims would require invalidating the parole-revocation decision, and Medina had not alleged that the decision had been invalidated. The court dismissed these claims without prejudice.

Disability claims. The court dismissed Medina’s first and second claims against the individual defendants. The Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act do not allow damages suits against officials in their individual capacities, and Medina’s requests for injunctions against officials in their official capacities were moot because he was no longer in New York City Department of Correction or Department of Corrections and Community Supervision custody. The court dismissed these claims with prejudice as to the individual defendants.

The court allowed the disability claims to continue against the City and the State. It found that Medina had adequately alleged that his keratoconus, photophobia, and neuropathy substantially limited major life activities. It also found that his allegations about being denied accommodations at a shelter and while in custody were sufficient at the motion-to-dismiss stage. As to the State, the court found that allegations concerning the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision and Division of Parole sufficiently identified services and accommodations that Medina allegedly was denied because of his disabilities. The court noted that the factual record was not developed enough to decide whether the accommodations provided by the City were reasonable.

Equal-protection claims. The court dismissed Medina’s third and tenth claims. The third claim alleged that he was denied transportation accommodations, but he did not identify similarly situated people who received different treatment. The tenth claim challenged a New York statute that provides interpreters for certain people appearing before the parole board but does not expressly provide the same rights to visually disabled parolees. The court applied rational-basis review and concluded that the statute was rationally related to the legitimate state interest of helping people understand parole-board proceedings. These claims were dismissed without prejudice against all defendants.

Deliberate-indifference claim. The court dismissed Medina’s ninth claim against the State because it duplicated his Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act claims. The court allowed the claim to continue against parole officials Barbara Corse and Ronnesia Campbell. Medina alleged that he gave them a doctor’s letter stating that it was unsafe for him to travel alone, requested non-report status or home visits, was denied transportation accommodations, and was later hit by vehicles. At the pleading stage, the court found these allegations sufficient to claim that Corse and Campbell recklessly failed to address a known, excessive risk to his safety. The court also declined to grant them qualified immunity, a protection that can shield government officials from damages when their conduct did not violate clearly established law.

Disposition

The motions to dismiss were granted in part and denied in part. Claims one and two were dismissed with prejudice against the individual defendants but survived against the City and the State. Claims three through eight and claim ten were dismissed without prejudice against all defendants. Claim nine was dismissed without prejudice against the State but survived against Corse and Campbell. The defendants were ordered to answer the Second Amended Complaint within two weeks after the opinion and order was entered. Judge Vernon S. Broderick directed the Clerk to terminate the two pending motions.