K.S. v. City of New York

Background

K.S. sued on behalf of herself and D.S., whom she adopted in May 2018. The complaint alleged that D.S. spent approximately nine years in foster care and experienced sexual abuse, neglect, inappropriate placements, inadequate medical and mental-health care, and inadequate education. The defendants included the City of New York, the Administration for Children’s Services, foster-care agencies and their employees, and New York City education entities and officials.

The complaint alleged that defendants failed to protect D.S. from harm, failed to provide appropriate foster-care placements and services, discriminated against him because of his disabilities, and failed to provide an appropriate education. It also alleged that foster-care defendants gave K.S. incomplete information about D.S.’s history and needs before she became his foster parent and adopted him.

The defendants moved to dismiss parts of the second amended complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which asks whether the complaint alleges enough facts to make a legally plausible claim. The court treated the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true for purposes of deciding the motions, without deciding whether the allegations could ultimately be proven.

Rulings on the Foster-Care Defendants’ Motion

The court denied the motion to dismiss the claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including claims based on the Fourteenth Amendment and the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act. The court held that the foster-care agencies were state actors for purposes of these claims because Second Circuit precedent treats foster-care agencies exercising custodial authority over children as performing a public function for which the government retains ultimate responsibility.

The court also held that the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act provisions concerning written case plans, case-review systems, updated health and education records, and criminal-background checks confer federal rights that may be enforced through § 1983. The court concluded that the allegations about missing health and mental-health records, unsafe placements, and failures involving background checks were sufficient at the pleading stage.

The court denied the motion to dismiss the Rehabilitation Act claim against the foster-care defendants. The complaint plausibly alleged that D.S.’s disabilities substantially contributed to his inability to meaningfully access foster-care services and that defendants failed to provide reasonable accommodations, including appropriate medical, mental-health, and therapeutic-placement services.

The court denied the motion to dismiss the fraudulent-inducement claim against the foster-care defendants. The complaint alleged that defendants made material misrepresentations and omissions about D.S.’s history and needs, including his history of sexual abuse and sexualized behavior, to induce K.S. to accept him as a pre-adoptive foster child. The court also denied the motion to dismiss the breach-of-contract claim, finding that the complaint identified contract duties involving safe care, medical services, sibling visitation, certification requirements, and compliance with the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children.

The court denied the motion to dismiss the New York Constitution claim against the foster-care defendants. Although the complaint did not identify a specific constitutional provision, the court held that the defendants had not shown that the factual allegations were insufficient merely because the complaint failed to cite the provision correctly.

The court granted the foster-care defendants’ motion to dismiss the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act claims and the portion of Count X based on New York education laws and regulations. The court also granted the motion to dismiss certain claims that the plaintiffs agreed they did not intend to bring against those defendants.

Rulings on the City Defendants’ Motion

The court granted ACS employees Smith and Frankel’s motion to dismiss the claims against them. The court found that the complaint did not specifically allege what information either employee reviewed, what risk either employee knew about, or how either employee’s conduct substantially contributed to D.S.’s alleged harm. The court also found that Frankel’s approval of reports, without allegations identifying the relevant information in those reports, did not establish personal involvement.

The court denied the City defendants’ motion to dismiss the Rehabilitation Act claim. The complaint alleged that education officials failed to provide D.S. an appropriate public education for four school years, failed to offer a placement for another school year, and delayed recommending residential treatment. The court held that these allegations plausibly suggested bad faith or gross misjudgment, which can support a Rehabilitation Act claim based on serious failures to provide educational services to a student with a disability.

The court granted the City defendants’ motion to dismiss the fraudulent-inducement claim, finding that the complaint did not allege with sufficient particularity that the City defendants acted with fraudulent intent or that their conduct induced K.S. to adopt D.S. The court also granted the City defendants’ motion to dismiss the breach-of-contract claim and the New York Constitution and statutory-law claims. The reason for dismissing the latter claims was the plaintiffs’ failure to comply with New York’s notice-of-claim requirement, which requires timely written notice for certain claims against school entities and officials.

Disposition and Effect

The court’s order granted in part and denied in part both motions to dismiss. Claims under § 1983 and the Rehabilitation Act, along with specified state-law claims against some defendants, were not dismissed. Other claims, including the IDEA claims against the foster-care defendants, the claims against Smith and Frankel, and specified state-law claims against the City defendants, were dismissed. The order did not decide whether the plaintiffs would ultimately prevail on the claims that remained. Judge Paul A. Crotty directed the clerk to close the two motions.