Sullivan v. Gelb

Background

Mark Sullivan sued Peter Gelb, Marcia Sells, Stephanie Basta, and Samuel Wheeler in New York Supreme Court. Sullivan alleged claims involving his employment with the Metropolitan Opera, including tortious interference with contractual relations, breach of the implied promise of good faith and fair dealing, retaliation under New York Labor Law § 740, concerted-action liability, violations of New York City Health Code provisions, an alleged unauthorized practice of medicine, and breach of the duty of fair representation.

Sullivan alleged that the Metropolitan Opera and the American Guild of Musical Artists agreed to COVID-19 vaccination and workplace-safety policies. He alleged that he declined the policy, requested an accommodation, was placed on unpaid leave, and was later terminated after failing to provide proof of vaccination. He also alleged that Samuel Wheeler, an American Guild of Musical Artists representative, acted in bad faith by agreeing to the COVID-19 policy and later failing to represent Sullivan adequately during the grievance process. The complaint stated that Sullivan’s employment was governed by an individual contract and a collective bargaining agreement.

The defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act completely preempted Sullivan’s state-law claims. Sullivan moved to remand, arguing that section 301 was not involved. The court evaluated removal based on the original complaint—the pleading in place when the defendants removed the case—even though Sullivan later amended his complaint.

Court’s analysis

The court held that Sullivan’s complaint raised a federal claim because it alleged that Wheeler breached the duty of fair representation. That duty requires a union representative to represent members without arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad-faith conduct. The court found that Sullivan’s allegations about Wheeler’s agreement to the COVID-19 policy, lack of notice, refusal to answer questions, and refusal to negotiate in arbitration were consistent with an attempt to plead that federal claim, even though Sullivan did not list it as a separately numbered cause of action.

Because a claim for breach of the duty of fair representation arises under federal labor law, the court found federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. The court further held that the entire action could be removed under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 because the case included a claim within the court’s original federal jurisdiction. It did not decide whether the court has supplemental jurisdiction over Sullivan’s state-law claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Disposition

The court found that removal was proper under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441 and denied Sullivan’s motion to remand. The Clerk of Court was directed to terminate the motions pending at Dkt. Nos. 37, 65, and 67. This opinion addressed the location and jurisdiction of the case, not whether Sullivan ultimately succeeds on his claims.