The 79th Group, Inc. v. Moore

Background

The 79th Group, Inc. sued Jacob Moore under New York common-law claims for injurious falsehood and defamation. The Complaint alleged that Moore made statements to clients, posted statements on LinkedIn, and sent an email accusing the company and related individuals of misconduct, including operating a Ponzi scheme. The company alleged that these statements caused it to lose investors and harmed its reputation.

Moore, who was proceeding without a lawyer, moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), which allows dismissal when the court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The company argued that New York’s long-arm statute, specifically N.Y. C.P.L.R. 302(a)(1), gave the court specific personal jurisdiction because Moore had transacted business connected to New York. The company also alternatively requested jurisdictional discovery.

Personal Jurisdiction

The court held that the company had not made the required initial showing that personal jurisdiction existed. It treated the injurious-falsehood claim like the defamation claim for jurisdictional purposes because both claims rested on the allegedly defamatory statements.

For the alleged communications with Moore’s clients, the Complaint did not say that the clients were in New York or had any other connection to New York. The court rejected the company’s attempt to supply that information through its opposition brief because a party cannot amend its Complaint through a brief.

For the LinkedIn post, the court concluded that the post appeared to concern the United Kingdom-based parent company rather than The 79th Group, Inc., the New York-based plaintiff. The post referred to “Southport” and to business in the United Kingdom, and the company could not identify Moore’s LinkedIn followers. The court ruled that merely making a post accessible to people in New York did not show that Moore purposefully targeted New York.

For the email, the court found that the company had not alleged that Moore knew the copied recipient was affiliated with a New York-based firm. The recipient’s United Kingdom email address further supported the court’s conclusion that Moore had not purposefully directed the email at New York.

The court also held, in the alternative, that exercising jurisdiction would violate constitutional due-process requirements. Specific personal jurisdiction requires a connection between the defendant’s deliberate contacts with the forum and the claims. The court concluded that the company had not shown such a connection for any of the client communications, the LinkedIn post, or the email.

Jurisdictional Discovery and Disposition

The court denied the company’s request to pause the motion and allow jurisdictional discovery. It concluded that, even accepting the company’s nonconclusory allegations as true, the company had not made an initial showing that New York could exercise jurisdiction over Moore.

The court granted Moore’s motion to dismiss. It dismissed the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction without prejudice. The court also denied the company’s discovery letter motion as moot, directed the clerk to terminate the pending motions, and closed the case.

Judge’s Ruling

Judge Jennifer L. Rochon ruled that New York lacked both a statutory and constitutional basis to exercise personal jurisdiction over Moore. The opinion’s discussion contains one apparent wording error referring to a “Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss,” but the surrounding analysis and conclusion identify Moore as the moving party and state that his motion was granted.