Schulte v. United States of America

Background

Joshua Adam Schulte, a former Central Intelligence Agency employee, was detained at the Metropolitan Correctional Center from 2018 through October 2021. He alleged that conditions of his confinement, including restrictive measures imposed to prevent disclosure of classified information, supported claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). In an earlier order, the court dismissed most of his claims and allowed him to replead some of them. Schulte then filed an Amended Complaint with assistance from pro bono counsel.

The Government moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), which permits dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing that Schulte had not exhausted the FTCA’s administrative presentment requirement. That requirement generally requires a claimant to submit a written claim to the appropriate federal agency within the applicable period and state a specific amount of damages.

The parties’ positions

Schulte asserted that he satisfied the requirement on December 14, 2020, when he delivered two envelopes to Bureau of Prisons employees for mailing to the relevant Bureau of Prisons and Department of Justice offices. He said the envelopes contained notices describing his claims and demanding specific sums. The Government did not dispute, for purposes of the motion, that the notices were delivered to Bureau of Prisons employees or that they otherwise contained enough information to satisfy the presentment requirement. Instead, it argued that the notices were never received by the responsible Bureau of Prisons office or the Department of Justice.

The Government relied on a Second Circuit decision holding that the ordinary mailbox rule does not apply to FTCA presentment because the agency must actually receive the claim. The court distinguished that decision because it involved a non-prisoner and the ordinary mailbox rule, rather than the prison-mail rule. The court also considered Schulte’s separate administrative complaints but noted that those complaints did not demand specific sums and therefore did not satisfy the FTCA requirement.

Court’s analysis

The court held that the FTCA and its regulation did not require delivery to a particular office within the relevant agency. The statute refers to the appropriate federal agency, and the regulation refers to the agency whose activities gave rise to the claim. The court therefore concluded that delivery to the wrong officer within the relevant agency can satisfy presentment. It also noted that a claim misfiled with the wrong agency may sometimes satisfy the requirement if it provides enough information to permit transfer to the appropriate agency.

The court further held that a Second Circuit decision called Tapia-Ortiz v. Doe remains controlling. Tapia-Ortiz expressly applied the prison-mail rule to an FTCA administrative filing. That rule treats a document as filed when a prisoner delivers it to prison officials. The court acknowledged tension between Tapia-Ortiz and the Government’s cited decision, Cooke v. United States, which emphasized actual agency receipt, but explained that Cooke did not cite or overrule Tapia-Ortiz. Because the earlier decision remains binding, Schulte’s December 14, 2020 mailing could satisfy the presentment requirement even though the Government had no record of receiving it.

The court did not reach Schulte’s alternative argument that Bureau of Prisons officers had prevented him from satisfying the requirement. It also did not decide the underlying merits of his FTCA claims.

Disposition

The court denied the Government’s motion to dismiss Schulte’s Amended Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Separately, the court granted as unopposed the portion of the Government’s motion seeking dismissal of declaratory and injunctive relief, because the FTCA does not permit that relief and Schulte was no longer detained at the Metropolitan Correctional Center. The Government was ordered to file an answer within two weeks, unless the court ordered otherwise.