Thompson v. City of New York

Background

Eon Thompson, proceeding without a lawyer, sued the City of New York, city officials, the Correction Officer’s Benevolent Association, Inc. (COBA), Koehler & Isaacs LLP and its later-named successor firm, and lawyers Cory Garcia and Andrew Rowe. Thompson is a correction officer employed by the New York City Department of Corrections.

The case arose from a September 2017 struggle involving Thompson, other correction staff, and an inmate. Thompson alleged that he used force only to help restrain the inmate and prevent him from biting someone. Department reviews initially found that the force was necessary and consistent with department directives. In 2019, however, Thompson was charged in disciplinary proceedings under New York Civil Service Law § 75 and later received a 55-day suspension without pay.

Thompson alleged that the disciplinary proceedings were conducted by administrative law judges who had been improperly designated by then-Commissioner Cynthia Brann. He also alleged that COBA and the union-retained lawyers failed to investigate the charges, provide discovery, explain his rights, or adequately represent him. The Third Amended Complaint asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for due-process violations, claims under §§ 1985 and 1986 for civil-rights conspiracy, claims against the City and a former mayor under the municipal-liability doctrine, claims under New York City law and a mayoral executive order, and a Fourteenth Amendment liberty-interest claim.

Motions to dismiss

The court considered three motions to dismiss: one by COBA, one by the law-firm defendants, and one by the City Defendants. Under Rule 12(b)(6), the court accepted non-conclusory factual allegations as true and assessed whether the complaint stated legally plausible claims. Because Thompson was representing himself, the court read his allegations liberally and considered the strongest arguments they suggested.

Claims against COBA and the law-firm defendants

The court dismissed Thompson’s § 1983 claims against COBA and the law-firm defendants because he did not adequately allege that these private parties acted under color of state law. A private party can sometimes be treated as a state actor when the government coerces it, significantly encourages its conduct, or the private party jointly participates with the government. But the court found Thompson’s allegations that COBA and the law firms acted jointly with the City and the Department of Corrections to be legal conclusions unsupported by specific facts. Cooperation in disciplinary proceedings, the City’s provision of vehicles for COBA board members, dissatisfaction with the lawyers’ representation, and settlement discussions did not establish state action.

The court also dismissed the § 1985 conspiracy claims against COBA and the law-firm defendants. Thompson did not allege that the supposed conspiracy was motivated by racial, class-based, or other invidious discriminatory animus. Because a valid § 1985 claim is required for a § 1986 claim, the court dismissed the § 1986 claims as well.

Claims against the City Defendants

The court held that the claims against the City Defendants were barred by res judicata, a rule that generally prevents a party from bringing a later case based on the same factual dispute after an earlier case was adjudicated. Thompson had previously sued officials and entities in New York state court over the same disciplinary proceeding and the alleged improper designation of administrative law judges. The state court dismissed that case and ruled that the challenges to Brann’s assignment of the proceeding and the authority of the administrative law judges were without merit.

Applying New York preclusion law, the court found that the federal claims arose from the same factual grouping as the state-court claims. It also concluded that the earlier proceeding was a hybrid proceeding that included both Article 78 claims and a request for declaratory relief, so the earlier judgment could preclude the later federal claims. The court rejected Thompson’s arguments that the state-court decision was unsigned or forged, that he had offered to settle the earlier case, and that the state court had made legal or factual errors. The court stated that disagreement with the state-court ruling should have been pursued through an appeal rather than a new federal action.

The court added that, even if res judicata did not bar Thompson’s procedural-due-process claim, that claim would fail on the merits. The availability of a state-court Article 78 proceeding to challenge the deprivation was enough to satisfy the Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural-due-process requirement. The court therefore dismissed all claims against the City Defendants.

Request for sanctions

Thompson asked the court to sanction the City Defendants under Rule 11 based on his allegations that they submitted an unsigned or forged state-court decision. The court denied that request because Thompson did not comply with Rule 11’s procedural requirements: he did not show that he gave the City Defendants the required 21-day opportunity to withdraw or correct the challenged filing, and he did not present the sanctions request separately from his opposition to the motions to dismiss.

The court also declined to impose sanctions on the merits. It found that Thompson provided no evidentiary support for his forgery allegations, while documents and the state court’s online records supported the authenticity of the state-court decision. The court likewise declined to use its inherent power to sanction the City Defendants for fraud on the court.

Disposition

Thompson did not request permission to amend again. The court stated that he had already amended his complaint three times, had been warned that there would be no further opportunities to amend, and had not identified how another amendment could cure the defects. The court therefore dismissed the Third Amended Complaint with prejudice.

The conclusion states that the Defendants’ motions to dismiss were granted. The Clerk was directed to dismiss the Third Amended Complaint, close the motions at ECF Nos. 119, 121, and 122, and close the case. Judge Jennifer L. Rochon issued the order on March 21, 2024.