Howe v. Mendocino County
- Susan Illston
- 3:20-cv-02622
- U.S. District Court · Northern District of California
- 15
In Howe v. Mendocino County, Judge Illston granted defendants’ dismissal motion in part, denied it in part, and allowed amendment.
Barbara Howe and Jani Sheppard may amend claims 1 through 19, while claims 20 and 21 were dismissed with prejudice and claim 22 may proceed. The individual-capacity claims against Tammy Moss Chandler and William Schurtz were dismissed as specified by the court.
What happened
In Howe v. Mendocino County, Barbara Howe and Jani Sheppard sued Mendocino County, Tammy Moss Chandler, and William Schurtz over alleged retaliation, discrimination, due-process violations, and other employment-related conduct. The defendants asked the court to dismiss all 22 claims, arguing that the complaint was unclear and lacked sufficient factual detail.
The court found that most claims did not contain enough specific facts. It dismissed claims 1 through 19 without prejudice, meaning the plaintiffs could try to amend them. It dismissed claims 20 and 21 with prejudice, meaning those claims were ended and could not be refiled in this case. The court allowed claim 22 to proceed and denied the motion to dismiss that claim.
Judge Susan Illston also denied the defendants’ request for judicial notice. She dismissed certain claims against Chandler and Schurtz in their individual capacities with prejudice and dismissed the remaining individual-capacity claims against them without prejudice. The plaintiffs were given until August 14, 2020, to file an amended complaint.
The detailed version
- Howe v. Mendocino County · No. 3:20-cv-02622
- Susan Illston
- July 8, 2020
Background
Barbara Howe and Jani Sheppard sued Mendocino County, Tammy Moss Chandler, and William Schurtz. Howe formerly served as Assistant Director of the County’s Health and Human Services Agency. She alleged that she was forced to sign a resignation letter and was effectively terminated. Sheppard, who remained employed by the agency, alleged that she was subjected to retaliatory employment actions, including a reassignment that she characterized as a two-position demotion, exclusion from meetings and projects, denial of a position, and threatened termination.
The complaint asserted 22 claims. Claims 1 through 13 were federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including alleged violations involving free speech, equal protection, property rights, and due process. Claims 14 through 22 arose under California law and included retaliation, discrimination, hostile work environment, emotional distress, contract, wage-and-hour, and interference claims.
The defendants moved to dismiss all 22 claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). That rule permits dismissal when a complaint does not allege enough facts to state a legally plausible claim. The defendants also requested judicial notice.
Federal Claims
The court dismissed claim 1, alleging an unlawful intrusion on First Amendment free-speech rights, without prejudice. The complaint did not identify the specific statements Howe or Sheppard made, when they made them, or how those statements motivated the alleged employment actions.
The court dismissed claims 2 through 5, which alleged retaliation for protected speech under different theories of municipal liability, without prejudice. The complaint did not adequately describe the protected speech, the adverse actions, or the connection between the two.
The court dismissed claims 6 through 13, involving alleged violations of Fourteenth Amendment property, equal-protection, and due-process rights, without prejudice. Although the defendants argued that Howe had resigned and Sheppard remained employed, the court said the complaint alleged, however unclearly, that Howe was coerced into resigning and Sheppard was demoted. The court concluded that these claims might be viable if supported by more specific facts.
The court also stated that the claims based on an official policy, practice, or custom did not adequately explain the policy or custom involved. The claims based on failure to train or supervise did not adequately allege how the defendants failed to train or supervise employees. These deficiencies contributed to the dismissal of the relevant federal claims.
California Claims
The court dismissed claims 14 and 16, alleging retaliation under California Labor Code section 1102.5 and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, without prejudice. The allegations did not specify when reports were falsified, who falsified them, or what was false about them.
The court dismissed claim 15, alleging race, age, and sex discrimination under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, without prejudice. It found that the complaint lacked specific allegations that Howe was discriminated against because of age or race and lacked specific allegations that Sheppard was discriminated against because of age. The court also found the allegations concerning sexual orientation and preferential treatment too conclusory.
The court dismissed claim 17, alleging a hostile work environment, without prejudice. The complaint did not adequately identify who harassed the plaintiffs, when or where the harassment occurred, or how it was connected to a protected status.
The court dismissed claim 18, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, without prejudice. The allegations of extreme and outrageous conduct and emotional distress lacked specific facts and supporting details.
The court dismissed claim 19, alleging breach of oral, implied, and implied-in-fact contracts, without prejudice. The complaint did not explain the terms of the alleged contract, who made it, when it was made, or how it was breached.
The court dismissed claims 20 and 21, brought by Sheppard under California Labor Code sections 204, 510, and 226.7, with prejudice. Sheppard waived the section 204 claim but continued to assert an overtime claim under section 510. The court found that the complaint lacked details about the alleged unpaid overtime and also agreed that the cited statutes did not expressly apply to public agencies. Sheppard did not oppose the argument concerning meal and rest breaks under section 226.7, and the court likewise concluded that the statute did not apply to public agencies.
The court denied the motion to dismiss claim 22, which alleged intentional interference with prospective economic advantage and contract. Sheppard alleged that she had an agreement with the Community Foundation to provide an Executive Leadership Training, that Chandler knew about the relationship, contacted the Foundation’s executive director, and caused Sheppard’s workload and payment to be reduced. The court found these allegations sufficient for claim 22 to proceed at the motion-to-dismiss stage.
Individual-Capacity Claims and Disposition
The court stated that claims against Chandler and Schurtz in their individual capacities under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act or Title VII were dismissed with prejudice. It also dismissed the § 1983 claims against them in their individual capacities without prejudice because the complaint did not allege facts or claims against them outside their official duties as County employees.
In its conclusion, the court dismissed claims 1 through 19 without prejudice, dismissed claims 20 and 21 with prejudice, and denied the motion to dismiss claim 22. The court denied the defendants’ request for judicial notice. The plaintiffs were permitted to file an amended complaint by August 14, 2020. This was a procedural ruling on the sufficiency of the pleadings rather than a final decision on the underlying employment allegations. Judge Susan Illston issued the order.
Read the full 15-page opinion on CourtListener, the free public archive maintained by the Free Law Project.